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Abstract
We study sequential auctions in which bidders demand multiple units. We collect
a novel data set on sequential water auctions for the empirical study. Although water
units are identical, two features from the empirical setting create a trade-oﬀ whereby
units of water end up being complements or substitutes. First, there is a water loss
that is only incurred for the first unit, generating a sunk cost. Second, subsequent units
of water exhibit decreasing marginal returns. Units of water are complements or sub-
stitutes depending on the relative importance of the sunk cost and decreasing returns.
Weather seasonality provides us with the required variation (in sunk costs relative to de-
creasing returns) to perform the empirical investigation. When units are complements,
one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others
from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, diﬀerent bidders win the
units with positive probability and pay prices of similar magnitude, even when the same
bidder wins all units. We analyze this stark pattern of outcomes not investigated in the
literature before. We recover individual demand consistent with this pricing behavior
and confirm it is not collusive, but consistent with non-cooperative behavior. Demand
estimates are biased if one ignores these features.
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1 Introduction.
There are many instances in the real world where several units of the same or similar goods are
allocated sequentially or periodically using auctions. Examples include timber, procurement
of public goods, electromagnetic spectrum, and treasury bills. The nature of the goods at
auction and the firms bidding determine whether the goods are complements (increasing
marginal returns) or substitutes (decreasing marginal returns). In many cases, goods are
complements because firms incur fixed costs to realize the full value of purchased goods. This
is the case of the machinery and workers needed to fell trees or build highways. Firms also
experience decreasing marginal returns due to limited capacity to hire more workers or buy
more machinery. Decreasing marginal returns also arise as a consequence of the downward
sloping demand for the firms’ final products. Once a firm has a valid spectrum for a given
county, the value of another tranche of the spectrum decreases substantially. We expect firms
to have increasing marginal returns if the first eﬀect dominates, decreasing marginal returns
if the second eﬀect dominates, and hill shaped marginal returns if both eﬀects are important.
By aﬀecting the valuation of subsequent units, fixed costs and decreasing returns deter-
mine bidder behavior and price dynamics. Price dynamics are central to connect observed
bids to the underlying distributions that characterize individual demand, which is fundamen-
tal to discuss positive and normative questions. For instance, variation in prices caused by
a high sunk cost will aﬀect even relatively simple tasks such as measuring the dispersion in
individuals’ private valuations. Moreover, in such a case, a competitive environment could
be incorrectly interpreted as collusive.
The existing literature on sequential auctions has provided little empirical evidence on
the eﬀect that complementarities or substitutabilities in the valuation of subsequent units
has on price behavior. The main reason for this lack of evidence is the challenge of finding
suﬃcient variation in the degree of complementarity. Our aim is to address this empirical gap.
To that end, we examine a unique panel data set that exploits large changes in the degree
of complementarity across seasons: variation in the importance of sunk costs relative to
decreasing returns. We use this variation to analyze bidding behavior in sequential auctions in
which buyers’ preferences for multiple units exhibit both sunk costs and decreasing marginal
returns. We investigate its implications for price dynamics and price competition.
The data in this paper comes from sequential water auctions from a self-governed com-
munity of farmers in Mula, Spain. The data allows to exploit a unique scenario to analyze a
stark pattern of outcomes not previously documented in the literature. Sometimes, winning
prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern. In this scenario, winning prices are similar in
magnitude, regardless of whether the same or diﬀerent bidders (farmers in our case) win the
sequential units.1 Other times, one farmer wins all the units, pays a high price for the first
unit, deters other farmers from entering subsequent auctions, and thus pays a very low price
1Declining prices for identical objects is an empirical regularity known as the declining price anomaly,
which was first documented by Ashenfelter (1989) in his seminal paper.
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for the remaining units. We call this the deterrence eﬀect. We show that this pattern of out-
comes is consistent with a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the observed price dynamics
are competitive, not collusive.
The data for our analysis consist of individual winning bids and auction covariates. These
covariates include the amount of rainfall. The basic unit of sale is the right to use three hours
of water (432,000 liters) for irrigation. For each weekday, eight units are sold for each schedule:
four for daytime (7AM-7PM) and four for nighttime (7PM-7AM) irrigation. The auctioneer
sells first the twenty units corresponding to nighttime and then the twenty units corresponding
to daytime. This leaves ten four-unit sets of auctions that are sold in order. (The ten sets
of four-unit auctions are: Monday-nighttime, Tuesday-nighttime, and so on until Friday-
daytime.) Thus, the relevant unit of analysis for investigating individuals’ demand and
the pattern of outcomes is four-unit auctions. But units within each four-unit set are not
conditional-independent due to the presence of sunk costs. Observing the winner’s identity
allows us to estimate the model, as outlined in Section 6. Local weather conditions determine
the relevant agricultural irrigation technology and, hence, water demand. Additionally, as less
rain falls in summer than in winter in southern Spain, the presence of seasonalities provides
us with the variation in sunk costs relative to decreasing returns necessary to perform the
empirical investigation.
The interpretation of the data based on our economic model is fundamental to our ap-
proach. We model the environment as a sequential (ascending price) English auction along
the lines of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) and von der Fehr (1994) in which bidders, by in-
curring a participation cost, decide whether to attend each sale. We focus on the symmetric
conditional-independent private values paradigm that has dominated the literature (Donald
and Paarsch 1996). We incorporate two features from our empirical setting. First, a sunk
cost is incurred for the first unit bought because water flows through a channel dug into the
ground. Some water is lost when the channel is dry (the first unit), but the loss is negligible
for subsequent units. Engineers have estimated that 20% of the water of the first unit that
travels through a dry channel was lost (González-Castaño and Llamas-Ruiz 1991). Second,
decreasing marginal returns are present for subsequent units because the amount of irrigated
land is fixed.
The relative importance of sunk costs and decreasing marginal returns generates a trade-
oﬀ, whereby buyers’ bidding behavior depend on whether diﬀerent units are complements or
substitutes. When goods are complements, the same bidder wins all the objects paying a
high price for the first unit equal to the valuation for the whole bundle (four times the second
highest valuation for the first unit, adjusted for the complementarity eﬀect and participation
cost). By doing this, the winner of the first unit deters others from bidding on the remaining
three units, allowing this bidder to pay very low prices (close to zero) for the remaining three
units. The resulting price pattern, along with the same bidder winning all the units, may
lead to an incorrect collusive interpretation. When goods are substitutes, diﬀerent bidders
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win the objects with a positive probability and pay prices of similar magnitude, even when
the same bidder wins all the objects. We provide empirical evidence for the key features of
our model: participation and sunk costs. We argue that bidders are better informed than
the seller, whose mechanism ignores bidder preferences for multiple units. Nevertheless, a
sequential English auction achieves ex-ante eﬃciency, as we discuss in Subsection 7.2.
The price patterns that our model predicts provide us with a straightforward empirical
method to determine the regime being played (complements or substitutes). When goods
are complements, very low prices are paid by the same winner (the winner of the first unit)
for the second, third, and fourth units. This allows us to separate the data for each regime
using the procedure outlined in Section 5.
We estimate the distribution of private valuations by maximum likelihood using an ex-
ponential distribution and the English structure for the auction. To estimate sunk cost and
decreasing marginal returns, we form moment conditions based on the structural equations
of the model. We infer participation costs using data from auctions in which bidders were
present, but no one placed bids. This method gives us bounds on participation costs.
Our empirical work establishes three main results. First, we recover individual de-
mand—characterized by private valuations and the model’s structural parameters—that is
consistent with the described price patterns and the deterrence eﬀect in particular. Second,
the equilibrium price dynamics are consistent with competitive behavior. Non-cooperative
behavior is not only consistent with the deterrence eﬀect, but also predicts such price dif-
ferentials. Incentives to deviate from a collusive strategy are higher in spring and summer,
when water is more valuable. However, it is in spring and summer when we observe non-
cooperative behavior more often. Finally, we show that estimates that ignore the importance
of participation and sunk costs will be biased. We test whether price variations, conditional
on covariates, are better explained by our proposed model or a standard English auction
model without participation costs, using that the latter is encompassed by the former. The
approach of Haile and Tamer (2003), that relies on two basic behavioral assumptions, provides
a robust structural framework for inference. These minimal assumptions are not satisfied in
the present context. We discuss how Haile and Tamer’s structure can be interpreted in the
current setting.
In the next section, we describe the related literature. Section 3 discusses the auction
system, the empirical regularities, and the modeling assumptions required in our context.
Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 discusses regime determination. Section 6 examines
the estimation procedure. Section 7 presents the results, analyzes the importance of sunk
costs, and the interpretation of complementarities. Finally, Section 8 concludes. Additional
data description is provided in Section A in the online appendix. All proofs and extensions
of the model are in Section B in the online appendix.
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2 Contributions and Related Literature.
In this section we describe the related literature and highlight how our paper contributes to
the current body of work. This paper is most similar to the empirical literature investigating
the predictions of strategic bidding in sequential auctions with multi-unit demand. To best
of our knowledge, the price dynamics that we investigate (see Section 3) have not been
documented in the literature before. Most of the literature do not consider participation
costs in their analysis. We show that participation costs aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. We
then use our model to partially identify participation costs and estimate informative bounds.
Numerous empirical studies have highlighted the importance of complementarities (Anton
and Yao 1987; Gandal 1997; Wolfram 1998; Pesendorfer 2000; Marshall, Raiﬀ, Richard, and
Schulenberg 2006).2 Substitutabilities are a major component in several industries such as
sequential highway construction procurement auctions (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003),
sequential timber auctions (List, Millimet, and Price 2004), or sequential cattle auctions
(Zulehner 2009). Several authors have studied cases of either complements due to synergies
among auctioned goods, or substitutes due to decreasing marginal utility (Black and De Meza
1992; Branco 1997; Liu 2011). Selling goods in a bundle increases a seller’s revenue when
goods are complements (Palfrey 1983; Levin 1997, Armstrong 2000). Our setting diﬀers from
these scenarios in that we consider sequential, instead of simultaneous, auctions.3
Prior investigations of the relationship between sequential auctions and the complementar-
ity or substitutability between identical units are more scarce (e.g. Jeitschko and Wolfstetter
2002; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2012). Jeitschko and Wolfstetter 2002 analyze optimal
sequential auctions in a binary-valuations case. They find that English auctions extract
more rent than first-price auctions. Our model diﬀers as we consider the class of continuous
valuation distributions. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2012 allow for complementarities and
substitutabilities in a model of sequential auctions. They find that while first-price auctions
give greater revenue than second-price (English) auctions when the goods are substitutes,
the opposite is true for complements. Both mechanisms are eﬃcient in their model. Their
predictions about price trends are consistent with previous findings. Contrary to our analysis
with participation costs, where buyers are better informed than the seller, Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer 2012 examine the eﬀect of capacity constraints on bidding behavior in procure-
ment auctions using a two-period auction game where sellers have private information about
their costs. Balat (2013) and Groeger (2014) analyze dynamic auctions in the highway pro-
curement market. Balat (2013) extends the model from Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2012 by
2Outside the auction literature, Gentzkow (2007) studies the value of new goods using a model encom-
passing the possibility of both complementarities and substitutabilities.
3See Milgrom (2000) and Ausubel (2004) for recent contributions to this literature. Edelman, Ostrovsky,
and Schwarz (2007) study the properties of a “generalized English auction” used to sell Internet advertisements
and show their proposed mechanism has a unique equilibrium. Kagel and Levin (2005) experimentally
investigate multi-unit demand auctions with synergies, and compare behavior in sealed-bid and ascending-
bid uniform-price auctions. See Kagel (1995) for a survey on laboratory experimental auction markets.
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allowing endogenous participation and unobserved heterogeneity. Groeger (2014) analyzes
bidder learning in the entry stage of an auction game.4 Finally, Hendricks and Porter (1988)
conducted an early and influential investigation on how interdependencies among auctioned
objects aﬀect the auction’s outcome. They analyze auctions for drainage leases and show that
better informed firms (which hold tracts neighboring the drainage tracts that were auctioned)
earned higher rents than uninformed ones.
This paper makes a methodological contribution by developing an empirical model of
sequential English auctions with participation costs that allows units to complement and
substitute for the same bidder depending on seasonalities. The model produces distinguish-
able price pattern predictions in each regime. This feature allows us to determine the regime
under which the game is being played using end-digit preferences. This allows us to weaken
the behavioral assumptions, such as the specification of bidders’ beliefs, that would be nec-
essary to solve the whole game (see Sections 4 and 5). Similar to the work of Hendricks
and Porter (1988) and Haile (2001), we show evidence inconsistent with the equilibrium pre-
dictions of standard models and supportive of a model that captures sunk costs, decreasing
marginal returns, and participation costs. Not accounting for these features may lead to the
incorrect interpretation of a competitive market as collusive.
We build upon the existing literature on participation costs and entry fees (McAfee and
McMillan 1987; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993; von der Fehr 1994) by constructing a sequen-
tial English auction model similar to that of Von der Fehr. However, our set-up diﬀers in
that bidders are allowed to buy more than one unit of the good. von der Fehr 1994 con-
siders the case when goods are independent and finds the same equilibrium as that of our
complementarities case.
While the auction literature has studied price dynamics and the relationship between
sequentially auctioned goods (for example, Weber 1983; McAfee and Vincent 1993; Benhardt
and Scoones 1994; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994), to the best of our knowledge, we analyze a
stark pattern of outcomes not investigated in the literature before. Sometimes, when goods
are substitutes, winning prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern: regardless of whether
the same or diﬀerent bidders win the sequential units, winning prices are similar in magnitude.
Other times, when goods are complements, the same bidder wins all units by paying a high
price for the first unit, deterring others from bidding on subsequent units.5 We show that this
pattern of outcomes is consistent with a competitive market structure. We are not aware of
any study where identical units may complement and substitute within the same market and
for the same bidder.6 In addition to recovering the structural parameters that characterize
4In contrast, we investigate a stark price dynamics not documented before (see Section 3). In our empirical
setting, the same identical units sometimes complement and other times substitute for the same bidder. We
show that these price dynamics are not collusive, but consistent with non-cooperative behavior. In addition,
we infer participation based on two simple assumptions that provide us informative bounds.
5Declining or downward price trends in sequential auctions, the results we describe in Subsection 3.3,
have been broadly documented (for example, Ashenfelter 1989; Ashenfelter and Genesove 1992; McAfee and
Vincent 1993).
6The literature in multi-unit auctions can be divided into sequential auctions, in which the auctioneer
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individual demand and confirming it is consistent with non-cooperative behavior, which are
of interest to the literature on empirical auctions, we collect a unique panel data set to
examine a market institution that was active and stable for eight centuries in a self-governed
community of farmers in southern Spain.7 Understanding this strategic non-cooperative
behavior of bidders in this stable market institution is of independent interest.
3 Background on the Market.
The data in this paper come from all water auctions in Mula, Spain, from January 1954
through August 1966, when the last auction was run.8 On August 1st, 1966, the allocation
system was modified from an auction to a two-sided bargaining system. In the bargain-
ing system, the Heredamiento de Aguas (water-owners holding) and Sindicato de Regantes
(land-owners association) arranged a fixed price for every cuarta of water (the smallest unit
auctioned). Gradually, the Sindicato de Regantes bought shares in the Heredamiento de
Aguas association until they finally merged in 1974. Thereafter, water was allocated to each
farmer following a fixed quota with each piece of land entitled to some proportion of the
water every year.
The reasons for focusing on the period from 1954 to 1966 are, first, that it represents the
final period of the auction allocating system in use for at least eight centuries in this region.
Second, the government conducted a special agricultural census in 1954/55, providing detailed
information about the farmers who bid in this period’s auctions
The study of these sequential auctions introduces a unique circumstance for analyzing a
stark pattern of outcomes not previously documented in the literature. Sometimes, winning
prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern where, regardless of whether the same or diﬀer-
ent farmers win the sequential units, prices are similar in magnitude (Figure 1). Other times,
one farmer wins all sequential units: he pays a high price for the first unit, deterring other
farmers from entering subsequent auctions, thus paying a very low price for the remaining
units (Figure 2).9 This stark pattern of outcomes is consistent across the whole sample (see
sells the units following a series of sequential steps using a single-unit auction each time, and simultaneous
auctions, in which the auctioneer uses a complex mechanism to allocate all units simultaneously. For recent
contributions see Kastl (2011), who investigates bidders submitting step functions as their bids in multi-
unit treasury bills auctions, and Reguant (2013), who studies complementarity bidding mechanisms used in
wholesale electricity auctions. Implementing a simultaneous auction requires a strong commitment from the
auctioneer either to not renege in the promised mechanism, or to use the information elicited in the process
to demand a higher price for the good. This also imposes technical diﬃculties in the way bidders frame their
contingent bids (Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg 2006). Neither of these conditions are satisfied in our
setting. Hortaçsu (2011) discusses recent progress in the empirical study of multi-units auctions. See Kagel
and Levin (2001) for an experimental investigation when bidders demand multiple units in sealed bid and
ascending auctions.
7In the lead article of the first issue of the American Economic Review, Coman (1911) provides an early
discussion of the same institution that is analyzed in detail in this paper. For an extensive study of self-
governed irrigation communities see Ostrom (1992).
8Data available in the historical archive of Mula go back to 1803.
9In terms of purchasing power, one peseta from 1950 is approximately equivalent to 0.43 U.S. dollars from
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Table 1 and Figure 5 that we describe in Subsection 3.3).
3.1 Water Auctions as Allocation System.
Although the process of allocating water in Mula has varied slightly over time, the basic
structure has essentially remained unchanged since the 15th century. Land in Mula is divided
into regadío (irrigated land) and secano (dry land). Irrigation is only permitted in the former.
A channel system directs water from the river to regadío lands.10 Regadío are fertile lands
close to rivers, and thus allow a more eﬃcient use of the water in the region. Since it is
forbidden to irrigate lands categorized as secano, only the farmers that own a piece of regadío
land in Mula are allowed to buy water.
The mechanism to allocate water to those farmers was a sequential outcry ascending
price (or English) auction. The auctioneer sold by auction each of the units sequentially and
independently of each other. The auctioneer tracked the name of the buyer of every unit and
the price paid by the winner.11
The basic selling unit is a cuarta (quarter), which is the right to use water that flows
through the main channel for three hours. Water storage is done in the De La Cierva dam.
Water flows from the dam through the channels at approximately 40 liters per second. As a
result, one cuarta carries approximately 432,000 liters of water. Traditionally, auctions were
held every 21 days to complete a tanda (quota), the basic aggregate unit of irrigation time.
During our sample period, auctions were carried out every Friday.
During each session, 40 cuartas were auctioned: four cuartas for irrigation during the day
(from 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM) and four cuartas for irrigation during the night (from 7:00 PM
to 7:00 AM), for each weekday (Monday to Friday). The auctioneer first sold the 20 cuartas
corresponding to the night-time, and then the 20 cuartas corresponding to the day-time.
Within each day and night group, units were sold beginning with Monday’s four cuartas,
and finishing with Friday’s.
3.2 The Dataset.
We combine data from four sources. The first is auction data, that we collected from the
historical archive of Mula.12 Based on bidding behavior and water availability, auction data
2013 (for details see Section A in the online appendix).
10The channel system was expanded from the 13th to 15th century as a response to the greater demand for
land due to population increase. The regadío land structure has not changed since the 15th century.
11The farmers could not store water in their plots. Reselling water was forbidden. While a farmer could
steal water by opening the gate next to his own parcel, the technology for detection of this crime was eﬀective
as irrigation was done by flood irrigation (more on this in Subsection 4.2). It was easy to determine who
stole water just by identifying a flooded parcel from a farmer who did not buy water in the auction for that
specific day-schedule (conditional on rainfall). The Tribunal de los Hombres Buenos (Council of Good Men),
composed by elected members among the farmer community, was responsible to adjudicate conflicts between
the farmers. Conflicts mostly arose over unpermitted irrigation. We investigate this behavior in Donna and
Espin-Sanchez (2013b).
12From the section Heredamiento de Aguas, boxes No.: HA 167, HA 168, HA 169, and HA 170.
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can be divided into three categories: (i) Regular periods, when the name of the winner, price
paid, date and time of the irrigation for each auction transaction was registered; (ii) No-supply
periods, when no auctions were conducted due to water shortage in the river or damage to
the dam or channels, usually due to intense rain; and finally (iii) No-demand periods, when
auctions were held but no one bid, leaving the registration auction sheet blank. The sample
for this study includes nearly 13 years of auction data spanning January 1954 to August
1966. Every week, 40 units (corresponding to 40 cuartas) were sold, with the exceptions
being when no auction was run (no-supply) or no bids were observed (no-demand). A total
of 17,195 auctions were run during the period under analysis. 13
We link auction data to the data that we collected from the 1954/55 agricultural census
from Spain, which provides information on individual characteristics of farmers’ land.14 The
census was conducted by the Spanish government to enumerate all cultivated soil, production
crops, and agricultural assets available in the country. Individual characteristics for the
farmers’ land (potential bidders which we link with the names in the auctions data) include
the type of land and location, area, number of trees, production, and the price at which this
production was sold in the census year. Figure 3 shows a sample card for one farmer from
the census data. During the 13-year period under analysis, there were approximately 500
diﬀerent bidders in our sample. The number of bidders who won auctions during a specific
year was considerably lower—the mean for our sample is around 8 (see table 5, discussed in
Subsection 6.2)—and conditional on participation, each farmer won on average 22 units per
year. This is consistent with the census data, where mean land extension is 5.5 ha. with an
average of 33 trees per ha.15
We also link auction data to daily rainfall data for Mula and monthly price indices for
Spain, which we obtain from the Agencia Estatal de Metereología, AEMET (the National Me-
teorological Agency), and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, INE (the National
Statistics Institute of Spain), respectively.
13Table A1 on page A-3 in the online appendix displays the frequency distribution of units in the auctions
disaggregated by the units bought sequentially by the same farmer.
14From the section Heredamiento de Aguas in the historical archive of Mula, box No. 1,210.
15Average annual rainfall during the period is 320 mm. Recent irrigation studies on young citrus plantings
have shown a water use of 2-5 megalitres per hectare annually (Chott and Bradley 1997). Water savings are
possible if irrigation can be allocated to similar units of production, such as young trees or reworked sections
of a property. In arid regions, like Murcia, water requirements are around 20% less and they are lower for
mature trees. Some farmers that are part of water-owner holding use their own water instead of selling it
through auctions. Although water stress during droughts aﬀects the quality of production, trees would hardly
die as a result. During a normal year without drought, trees could survive the whole year from rainfall alone.
For further details see, for example, Chott and Bradley (1997), Wright (2000), and du Preez (2001). Finally,
note that although the average number of trees per farmer is 161 (see Table A2 in Subsection A in the online
appendix), the average number of trees per hectare in our sample is 33, a lower number compared to the
conventional agricultural standard spacing for citrus trees that is 100 trees per hectare.
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3.3 Summary Statistics.
Mediterranean climate rainfall occurs mainly in spring and autumn. Peak water requirements
for the products cultivated in the region are reached in spring and summer, between April and
August. Soaring demand is reflected by the frequency of auctions where the same farmer buys
all four consecutive units (4CU), which reaches its peak during these months (see Figure 14
and the discussion in Subsection 7.2). The frequency of 4CU is not homogenous over time,
but is related to seasonal rainfall, as can be seen in Figure 4. Overall, 42% of the units
were sold in 4CU.16 There are no observations where the same farmer buys more than four
consecutive units, nor observations where the same farmer buys consecutive units across days
(e.g. there are no observations where the same farmer buys the last units of a day-auction,
and the first units of the night-auction).
We only observe the transaction price (winning bid) and the identity of the winner (name).
(We do not observe all bids.) There is substantial price variation, both within and across
four-unit auctions. Winning prices range from 0.05 pesetas (ptas) to 4,830 ptas, with a mean
of 271.6 ptas. As expected, winning prices and the frequency distribution of 4CU are strongly
correlated with past rainfall (Figure 4). Table 1 exhibits the distribution of winning prices
by both the number of consecutive units bought by the same individual (1CU, 2CU, 3CU, or
4CU) and by sequential auction (1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th). The greater variation that we observe
for 4CU (with respect to non-4CU) has a well defined pattern. While mean prices for the
first auction in 4CU are considerably higher than for non-4CU (Table 1, Panel 2: 677.6 ptas
for 4CU against 211.1 ptas for 1CU, 305 ptas for 2CU, or 410 ptas for 3CU), mean prices
for fourth auctions in 4CU are the smallest (Table 1, Panel 5: 210.1 ptas for 4CU against
233.4 ptas for 1CU, 239.6 ptas for 2CU, or 311.6 ptas for 3CU). Median and maximum prices
display similar patterns.
Figure 5 presents price variation by number of consecutive auctions won by the same
individual (left panel) and by sequential auction (right panel). The figure shows that the
stark pattern of outcomes from Figures 1 and 2 is consistent across the whole sample. On
the one hand, in the top panel of Figure 5 we can see that price dispersion—as well as the
mean and median price—is higher when the same farmer wins all four consecutive units (in
the top panel, last vertical box labeled 4). On the other hand, in the bottom panel, where we
further disaggregate each box from the top panel by unit (first unit, second unit, third unit,
and fourth unit), we can see that the higher price dispersion for unit 4 in the top panel—as
well as the higher mean and median—is generated by the greater variation in prices for first
units in the lower panel (not by prices in second, third, and fourth units).
This particular pattern in prices is caused by the above mentioned deterrence eﬀect
whereby farmers exhibit diﬀerent behavior based on seasonality and rainfall, i.e., residual
demand for water. During high demand and low rainfall months, the same farmer buys
16Table A1 in Section A in the online appendix displays the frequency distribution of units sold by number
of units bought by the same farmer.
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all four sequential units, paying a high price for the first unit (with respect to the median
or average price conditional on rain) and very low prices for the remaining units. During
months when demand is not high due to farming seasonalities or when rainfall is high, win-
ning prices for all units are similar in magnitude, regardless of whether the same farmer wins
all sequential units (4CU) or diﬀerent farmers win subsequent units (1CU, 2CU or 3CU).
Aggregate prices over time display consistent trends with the ones found in the empirical
literature on sequential auctions. Figure 6 shows that, on average, per unit prices decline by
sequential unit (being the first unit of each day higher than second to fourth units), and by
day of the week (prices decline from Monday to Friday). Figure 6 also shows that per unit
prices are slightly higher during the day than during the night. High water requirements for
citrus during summer causes prices to soar during those months (Figure 7). As expected,
prices are also higher during droughts, after conditioning on seasons (Figure 8).17
Table 2 shows that these correlations are robust after conditioning on past rain, unit,
weekday, schedule, week-of-the-year, month, and individual fixed eﬀects. The table displays
the results obtained by regressing daily unit prices on a seven-day-rain moving average (Rain
MA7 ), the rain on auction day, and the mentioned fixed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcients
on Rain MA7 have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. From
column 1, a 10 millimeter (mm) increase in average rain in the previous week is associated
with a decrease of 40.5 ptas in the equilibrium price paid in the auction. The regression in
column 2 adds unit, weekday, and schedule fixed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcient on Rain
MA7 increases in magnitude and also has the expected sign. This regression also shows that,
as noticed in previous figures, price declines within day and across units (both for day-time
and night-time auctions) and across schedules (price is on average 110 ptas lower for night-
time auctions than for day-time auctions). The estimated coeﬃcients show that equilibrium
prices decline monotonically within the week (Figure 6). Columns 3 and 4 add, respectively,
month seasonal dummies and individual fixed eﬀects (we have 537 diﬀerent individuals in
our sample) to the specification in column 2. The estimated coeﬃcient on Rain MA7 in
column 3, though smaller, again has the expected sign and is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Similar qualitative results are obtained in column 4; however, the estimated coeﬃcient on
Rain MA7 has increased. Note that the goodness of the fit in the last regression is 36%,
indicating that average (or ex-ante) prices are explained relatively well by observables such
as rain in the previous week and time of the allocation. This evidence supports the idea the
observable (common knowledge) components of prices in drives four-unit auctions. Although
not reported, we performed an analogue analysis using average daily prices within schedule
as a robustness exercise and obtained similar results.
17See the online appendix for a discussion on droughts.
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4 The Model.
As noted above, bidding behavior is a result of a complex decision process. There are three
main features from the empirical setting that need to be accounted by the model: (i) sunk
costs that farmers incur when they buy their first unit, (ii) decreasing marginal returns of
subsequent units of water, and (iii) participation costs of farmers in this market.
Sunk Costs (SC). Water is allocated during the auction and is distributed on the specific
day and time of the irrigation accordingly. Water stored in the dam is delivered to the farmer’s
plot on this date using the channel system. Except the main canal, all channels are dug into
the ground (Figure 9). On the day of the irrigation, a guard opens the corresponding gates to
allow the water to flow to the appropriate farmer’s land. These channels are land-specific in
the sense that diﬀerent areas and lands have their own system of channels which only carry
water when the corresponding gates are opened. A concern is that farmers whose lands lie
next to each other may be buying diﬀerent sequential units for the same auction. In this case,
the SC would only be incurred by the first farmer for his first unit but not for the second
farmer for his first unit. We use data on the specific location of the farmers that we match
to auction winners to analyze these situations in Subsection 7.2. There is a water loss that
is incurred because water flows over a dry channel. Engineers have estimated this loss to be
between 15% and 40% (20% on average) of the water carried by one cuarta when the channel
is completely dry (see Vera Nicolás 2004). This is the SC incurred by the bidder for his first
unit. The SC is only incurred once, for the first unit, since water losses associated with a wet
channel are negligible. The channel dries out after approximately 12 hours without water
(González-Castaño and Llamas-Ruiz 1991). In 1974 the system of sub-canals was made of
concrete, instead of just dug in the ground, to prevent such losses (González-Castaño and
Llamas-Ruiz 1991).
Decreasing Marginal Returns (DMR). The second feature refers to the decreasing
marginal returns (DMR) eﬀect. The classic textbook case for DMR is appropriate for our
empirical application. Given that the amount of land owned by each farmer is fixed, marginal
productivity of subsequent units of water is decreasing. When assessing the relative impor-
tance of DMR, the impact in summer would generally be greater than in autumn. More
generally, one would expect DMR to be aﬀected by season and rain. When water require-
ments are high, the slope of the marginal productivity function will be relatively flat, as in
the left panel in Figure 10. This is likely to occur in spring and summer. On the other hand,
when water requirements are low, the slope of the marginal productivity function will be
steeper, as in the right panel in Figure 10. This is likely to happen in autumn or winter.
Participation Costs. There are several reasons why farmers face participation costs in
this market. The first component is opportunity cost. Farmers who value their time may
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prefer not to participate in the whole auction session. Auctions were run on Fridays during
work hours. Attending the auction entailed alternative use of working time for the farmer.
This type of cost aﬀects the number of farmers that participate in the auction, which we do
not observe, but not the behavior of the farmer during the auction.
The second component of participation costs correspond to the hassle costs associated
with active bidding. Only a fraction of the individuals who attended a Friday auction were
actively engaged in the bidding for a particular sequential auction of water and not everyone
who was present participated in every auction (Botía, Francisco, personal interview, Murcia,
June 17, 2013).18 As von der Fehr (1994) points out, a reasonable assumption for why only
a portion of attendees participate may be that they consider it so unlikely to that they will
win at a price below what they will be willing to pay, that they are not willing to bother to
engage in bidding. We expect this type of costs to be very small but positive.19
Empirical evidence from our data is consistent with the assertion that farmers dislike
participation, facing positive entry costs as they do. We observe multiple weeks per year
when auctions were run, farmers showed up and bought the first units of water, but no one
bid for the last units. Since there was no reservation price and the minimum bid increment
was cents, they could have potentially won all the remaining units bidding one cent. To the
contrary, they decided not to bid and instead left the auction. For example, on January 22,
1954, units 1 to 16 were sold to seven diﬀerent farmers but no one bid for units 17 to 20
(Figure 12). In 1954 we observe similar behavior for 14 weeks,20 and this is consistent along
the remaining years in our sample. To infer participation costs, we use 2, 423 auctions where
some bidders where present and no one bid for the last units, i.e., auctions similar to the
one in Figure 12. Our interpretation is that the utility for all bidders is smaller than the
participation cost, conditional on covariates. We use this information to partially identify
participation costs (see page 24).
4.1 Set Up.
We use the three main specific features from the empirical setting to build our model. A SC
is incurred only for the first unit bought while DMR are present for second to fourth units.
The relative importance of the SC and DMR generate a trade-oﬀ, whereby bidders coordinate
their behavior based on whether diﬀerent units are complements or substitutes. A simple
way to show this intuition is by assuming that the initial SC is proportional to the value of
water, and DMR are linear in the number of units bought. We parametrize the SC eﬀect
by (1  ⇢1), whose interpretation is the percentage of water loss from the first unit because
water is flowing through a dry channel (hence, proportional to the valuation of the bidder for
18A summary is available online in the online appendix at http://www.jdonna.org/water-auctions-web.
19Note that the results would be the same if participation costs were zero. However, the equilibrium when
goods are complements would not be unique (see Subsection 4.2).
20Weeks of January 22, February 5, April 5, May 1, May 8, May 15, May 22, May 29, June 5, June 12,
July 3, July 10, November 26, and December 3.
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the unit of water). One would expect that, conditional on rain, water loss would be constant
within season with relatively more importance (lower ⇢1) in summer.21 We parametrize the
DMR of unit k by ⇢k for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Let ⇢ be the vector of parameters that characterizes
marginal utilities, i.e. ⇢ ⌘ (⇢1, ⇢2, . . . , ⇢K). Then, the marginal utility for bidder i for each
unit k is:
MUki = ⇢k · vi,
where vi, only known by bidder i, is a scalar that captures the valuation that the bidder
assigns to their first (complete) unit of water, i.e., when ⇢1 = 0 we have MU1i = vi.
We consider vi to be independent and identically distributed on the interval R+, according
to the cumulative distribution function F (vi), for all bidders i = 1, . . . , N . We assume
that F (vi) admits a continuous density f (vi) > 0 and has full support. It is assumed that
E[vi] <1. The distribution F (vi) is fully characterized by the parameter µ. The assumption
that the support of F (vi) is bounded below by 0 is not restrictive, since bidders with negative
valuations will not enter the auction. The private valuation, vi, is only known by bidder i,
and it is learned before entering the first auction.22
The seller wants to allocate K identical units. These units are auctioned oﬀ sequentially
by the seller using an English (ascending price) auction for every unit. All participating
bidders observe the total number of individuals who take part of the auction, N . After
every auction, each participant observes both the price paid by the winner and the winner’s
identity. The seller continues to run subsequent auctions sequentially until all the units are
allocated. We assume that all bidders share the same utility function, U (·). The primitives
of the model, (K,N, µ, ⇢), are common knowledge.
The strategy set for every bidder is the vector   ⌘  yki , bki  k=1,...,Ki=1,...,N , where yki 2 {0, 1},
yki = 1 indicates that bidder i participates in the auction for unit k (yki = 0 if bidder i does
not participate in the auction for unit k), and bki is the maximum amount that bidder i is
willing to pay for unit k. Bidders play sequentially, or stage by stage. This means that they
choose  ki =
 
yki , b
k
i
 
after learning the outcome of the previous (k   1) auctions. Bidders
participating in auction k observe the price at which each bidder is no longer active (bids are
observable) except for the winning bid. The information transmission is consistent with the
auction being an English (or ascending price) auction rather than a second price auction.23
21We discuss variation of SC across auctions (conditional on covariates) in page 21 in the paper.
22We do not consider the case where farmers might have diﬀerent valuations for diﬀerent units of water.
The reason for this is that the units are identical and we condition on observables that may aﬀect the price of
water in the econometric specification (see Section 6.1). We obtained similar results by allowing the valuation
for subsequent units to be diﬀerent draws from the same distribution. The exposition of the model, however,
becomes more cumbersome.
23We model the game as in a button auction. Each bidder holds a button while the price continuously
rises. A bid for bidder i is the value at which bidder i stops holding the button. When there are only two
bidders active (holding the button) and one of them releases the button, the auction ends. The active bidder
wins the object and pays the price at which the runner up stopped. See Cassady (1967) and Milgrom and
Weber (1982) for details.
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The seller allocates the unit to the highest bidder: xkj 2 {0, 1} and xkj = 1 when j =
argmax
 
bki
 
i
(and 0 otherwise), at a price equal to the second highest bid: pk = bkl , where
l = argmax
i 6=j
 
bki
 
. Let Xki ⌘
j=kP
j=1
xji .be the number of units that bidder i has won before
participating in auction k. If only one bidder participates in a specific auction this bidder
obtains the object for free. Each object is either allocated to one of the N bidders, or it is
lost if none of the bidders decide to participate in the auction.
Participation decisions in each auction are done simultaneously by all bidders. To take
part in every auction each bidder incurs a participation cost, c > 0, at the beginning of
the period. We assume that participation in the first auction is free.24 If only one bidder
participates, this bidder obtains the object for free but he bears the participation cost, c,
nonetheless. The process is then repeated in every period.25
As discussed in previous subsection, the assumption of positive entry costs is consistent
with the data in our empirical setting, where we observe no demand for some of the units,
even though the reservation price is zero. The interpretation is that, in those situations
where no-demand is observed, the value that bidders assign to that unit is smaller than the
participation cost, c.26
The utility for a bidder who buys l units and participates in m auctions is:
Ui (l,m, vi; ⇢, c) =
lX
k=1
⇢k · vi  
KX
k=2
yki · c =
lX
k=1
⇢k · vi   (m  1) · c.
In the remainder of the paper we refer to vN :N as the highest realization of the random
variables v1, . . . , vn drawn independently from CDFs F1, . . . , FN (one draw from each distri-
bution), and vN 1:N , as the second highest realization. More generally, vj:N is the jth order
statistic for a sample of size N from the distribution F (vi).
4.2 Four-Unit Auctions.
The most comprehensive independent unit of analysis that could be considered is the weekly
auctions, encompassing all 40 units sold per week. This would be the relevant definition
to answer questions related to demand fluctuations generated by supply shocks, such as no
auctions due to drought or excessive rain, on an aggregate level. Alternatively, the narrowest
24Allowing for a positive cost in the first auction will not aﬀect the results qualitatively. However, the
estimated distribution then will not be the original distribution of valuations F (vi) but the distribution of
valuations conditional on vi being greater than some minimum threshold for entering the first auction v⇤, i.e.,
F ⇤ (vi) ⌘ F (vi|vi > v⇤). Alternatively, we could impose some restrictions on the distribution of valuations
to ensure that all bidders enter the first auction as in von der Fehr (1994).
25Bidders enter the auction if, and only if, the expected utility they obtain from the game is positive. See
von der Fehr (1994) for a discussion of entry when the goods are complements or the conditions needed for
entry when the entry cost in the first auction is positive.
26We later use this information to partially identify participation costs (see page 24). See above in this
section for justification of this assumption in our specific empirical setting.
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possible unit purchased is a cuarta (1 of the 40 weekly units). As discussed above in this
section, the presence of SC and DMR indicate that cuartas within a day-schedule are not
conditional-independent. Moreover, they are not the relevant unit of analysis to investigate
individual farmers’ demand, nor the price pattern described above.
Our original question is motivated by the price behavior caused by the deterrence eﬀect.
This particular behavior is observed within four-unit auctions and is the relevant unit of
analysis in the model. This is an implication of the way the auction is structured: twelve
hours of water (subdivided into four cuartas of three hours each) during day-time and twelve
hours of water during night-time, each weekday. The logic behind this structure is related to
water requirements in the area. First, water scarcity in the region made water accountability
crucial. The standard unit used to measure surface area in Mula is called tahúlla. One
tahúlla is, by definition, the surface area which can be irrigated in such a way that water
level rises 1-foot high in 1 minute.27 The surface area from one-tahúlla varies from one
town to another, depending on soil conditions.28 A four-consecutive units auction—half day,
twelve hours of irrigation—is, in that sense, the amount of water that absorbed by a regular
parcela (individual piece of land). Water requirements could and actually do diﬀer (a) across
farmers depending on farming trees and land extension, and (b) for the same farmer over
time depending on past rainfall.
Second, the irrigation technique used in Mula is flood irrigation. The farmer builds small
embankments in his parcela and water is delivered to the land by the channel system that
simply flows over the ground through the crop. Flood irrigation requires a minimum of water
delivery that, for a regular parcela, is captured by one tahúlla.
Finally, a supply-side consideration also plays a role. The reason to supply water for 12
hours (during day-time and during night-time) is to guarantee a particular and homogenous
quantity for each cuarta (which depends on water pressure since water units are defined in
hours). Given that the De La Cierva dam is continuously filled with water from the river,
spreading the supply provision across weekdays ensures the homogeneity of water units.
Our data confirm these three points, validating the relevant unit of analysis for individual
demand as four-consecutive units. The most frequent quantity purchased by farmers is
twelve hours of water (42% of sold units are 4CU). There are no observations where the same
farmer buys more than four consecutive units, nor observations where the same farmer buys
consecutive units across days (e.g. there are no observations where the same farmer buys the
last units of a day-auction, and the first units of the night-auction).
The next two assumptions allow us to determine the regime under which the game is
being played.
27Although close in magnitude, the traditional Murcian measure of foot is not exactly the same as the foot
measure used in the U.K. and the U.S. (Valiente 2001).
28The surface area of 1-tahúlla is 1,118 square meters in Murcia and 1,185 square meters in the old Kingdom
of Aragón, except the region of Pías Fundaciones. The tahúlla has been used in regadío lands since the reign
of Charles IV (king of Spain from 14 December 1788 until his abdication on 19 March 1808). In secano lands
the surface area measure used is the fanega and the celemín. For further details see Vera Nicolás (2004).
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Assumption 1 [A1]: ⇢1  ⇢4.
Assumption 2 [A2]: ⇢1 + ⇢2  ⇢3 + ⇢4.
When K = 4, we call it a strict complements regime when A1 and A2 holds. We call
a weak substitutes regime when neither A1 nor A2 holds. The following results summarize
equilibrium winning price behavior as a function of the model’s primitives (valuations, SC,
DMR, and participation costs). We later use these results for the estimation. We only
consider pure strategy symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).29 All proofs and
extensions are in Section B in the online appendix.
Proposition 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 hold) the pure strategy
symmetric PBE is:
• First auction:
- Participation: bidder i will always participate in the first auction, i.e. y1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: b1i (vi) =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   3c.
• Second, third, and fourth auctions:
- Participation: bidder i participates in each auction if, and only if, she won the
first auction, i.e. yki = 1 if, and only if, x1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: If bidder i participates in each auction (yki = 1 for k = 2, 3, 4),
she will continue bidding until the price reaches its own valuation for that individ-
ual unit, bli(vi) =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   (4  l) c.
Corollary 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 hold) the total utility
of the winner satisfies:
4X
k=1
pk =
4X
k=1
⇢k · vN 1:N   3c. (1)
Lemma 1. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the probability
that a bidder diﬀerent from the winner enters the last auction is decreasing in the participation
cost, c. Moreover, this probability goes to 1 when c goes to zero, i.e.:
Lim
c!0
 
Pr
 
yKi = 1 | x1j = 1, i 6= j
  
= 1.
29When K = 2, cases where ⇢2  0 and ⇢1 = ⇢2 are equivalent to von der Fehr (1994), in Subsections 3.2
and 3.4, respectively. Uniqueness, however, is not proved by von der Fehr in any of those cases.
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Corollary 2. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the marginal
utility of the winner in the last auction, depending on how many units the winner won,
satisfies:
If the winner won all four units:
p4 = ⇢1 · vN 1:N   c. (2)
If the winner won three units, two out of the first three, and the last one:
p4 = ⇢2 · vN 1:N   c. (3)
5 Regime Determination and End-Digit Preferences.
When goods are strict complements, very low prices—or, according to the auctioneer who
ran the auctions, symbolic prices (Botía, Francisco, personal interview, Murcia, June 17,
2013)30— are paid for the second, third, and fourth units by the winner of the first unit
(Figure 2 and Table 1). This feature allows us to determine the regime (strict complements
or weak substitutes) under which the game is being played using end-digit preferences and
without specifying further assumptions on the model’s primitives. When goods are strict
complements a key prediction from proposition 1 is that the same bidder will win all units,
pay his valuation for the whole bundle in the first auction, and pay a price of zero for the
second, third, and fourth units. We do not observe zero prices (for second, third, and four
units in the data), but very low prices (relative to the first price). These are symbolic prices.
Although there is no reserve price in the actual auctions, we interpret the minimum price
as a general agreement to bid a symbolic price in subsequent auctions. A common eﬀect in
our data is that farmers bid certain preferred end-digits prices substantially more often than
others. We use this information to determine both regimes.
Studies of digit distribution go back to Benford (1938) who documented that in large
data sets, leading digits are not distributed evenly (1 is the most common and 9 the rarest),
and proposed a distribution for first digits of numbers in naturally occurring data. Abrantes-
Metz, Villas-Boas, and Judge (2011) use Benford’s second digit reference distribution to
track the daily London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (Libor) from 2005 to 2008 and find that in
two periods, Libor rates depart significantly from the expected Benford reference distribution;
collusion or rate manipulation appear as likely outcomes to this behavior, the authors suggest.
Cramton and Schwartz (2000) also use end (trailing) digits to investigate collusive bidding
in the spectrum auctions. Rauch, Goettsche, Braehler, and Engel (2011) use a Benford test
to investigate the quality of macroeconomic data relevant to the deficit criteria reported to
Eurostat by the European Union member states; they find that the data reported by Greece
shows the greatest deviation from Benford’s law among all euro states.
30A summary is available online in the online appendix at http://www.jdonna.org/water-auctions-web.
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In regards to end-digit preferences, Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl (2001) use Israeli IPO auc-
tions to present evidence that investors have end-digit preference for round numbers (prices
that end with 0 or 5), and that prices that end with 0 are used more often than those ending
with 5.31 End-digit preferences and systematic age misreporting are important and broadly
studied issues in demography, particularly in survey and census data when respondents in-
accurately report ages or dates of birth (Myers 1940; Das Gupta 1975; Coale and Li 1991;
and Siegel, Shryock, and Swanson 2003). The concern in these cases is, typically, heaping on
particular ages such as those ending in 0 or 5. Crayen and Baten (2009) use some of these
techniques to investigate the phenomenon of age heaping, and to test the hypothesis that
an unequal distribution of human capital reduces welfare growth. Baker (1992) focuses on
digit preferences in CPS unemployment duration data, where he raises the question of what
can be said without making any specific assumptions concerning the true nature of end-digit
preference in the CPS, and shows that employment duration is sensitive to the choice of a
corrective for end-digit preference. Finally, end-digit preference has also been studied in the
medical literature pertaining to individuals reporting body weight and height, blood pressure,
and cigarette consumption (Bopp and Faeh 2008).
Table 3 shows in column 2 the frequency distribution by the last digit of price for first-unit
prices.32 We observe strong preferences for 0 and 1, and somewhat weaker preferences for
5. In 32.1% of the cases we see a multiple of 10, in 32.2% we see a price ending in 1, while
8.4% report a multiple of 5. The frequencies also show some preference for 2 and 6, but not
a marked one. After taking into account these eﬀects, we find that 48% of the first-unit price
observations are inconsistent with a uniform distribution in each digit.33 That is, we would
need to reclassify 48% of the cases to obtain a uniform distribution by digit. This is clearly
not the case for our underlying distribution. We interpret these results as strong end-digit
preference for 0 and weak end-digit preference for 5.
Strong preference for digit 1 is not, in general, an indication of a preference for this digit
per se but, instead, a sign of competition. According to our model, first-unit prices are always
competitive (in the sense that all N bidders will enter the auction when no information has
yet been revealed), regardless of the regime. Nevertheless, second to fourth-unit prices are
not competitive in the strict complements regime (competition in this regime takes part in
the first unit where they bid for the whole bundle, and then pay a symbolic price for the
second to fourth units since it is optimal for the remaining N   1 bidders not to enter in
these sequential auctions). Hence, end-digit preference for 1 in second to fourth-unit prices,
as a sign of competition, are indicative of a weak substitutes regime. Alternatively, end-digit
preference for 0 for second to fourth-unit prices are indicative of a strict complement regime.
31See Backus, Blake, and Tadelis (2013) for a recent application to negotiation in eBay auctions.
32We obtain similar patterns if we restrict the sample by month or schedule (day-time or night-time) or
both.
33This number corresponds to the value of the Whipple’s concentration index (Siegel, Shryock, and Swanson
2003). In the absence of digit preference one would expect 10% in each terminal digit.
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Moreover, in the strict complement regime the model predicts that all second, third, and
fourth consecutive prices will simultaneously behave in this fashion. Column 3 in Table 3
display the frequency distribution by the last digit of price for the second to fourth units.
Prices exhibit a pattern consistent with this description.
This behavior provides us with a natural lower bound for the strict complements regime,
namely, second, third, and fourth unit prices within the same four-unit auction show a strong
end-digit preference for 0. We use this behavior, along with the model, to identify the two
regimes.34
Figure 11 displays the histogram of the percentage change of first price against the median
of second to fourth price, by regime.35 It can be seen in the figure that end-digit preference
behavior (as defined above) also captures, in general, the other empirical prediction from
the model, namely, that prices are competitive in the weak substitutes regime but exhibit
the deterrence eﬀect in the strict complements one (the way to see this in the figure is that
percentage change from the first to the second, third or fourth prices is high when goods are
strict complements). This is remarkable as the end-digit preference behavior used to identify
the regime is unrelated a priori to this second empirical prediction. This provides further
evidence in favor of the model.36 Regime identification is done by using the strongest version
of the empirical prediction to identify the strict complements case, i.e., the case in the left
panel in Figure 11.
A final robustness check further shows that the approach in this section consistently
identifies both regimes in terms of our model. Columns 1 and 2 (first unit) in Table 4 display,
by regime, the frequency distribution in terms of end-digit prices for first-unit, among each
four-unit auction. As emphasized above, both regimes should exhibit competition for first-
unit prices according to our model. This competition is captured by the same distribution
among ending digits in both regimes. This is what we observe in columns 1 and 2 (first unit).
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 (fourth unit) show that, as predicted by the model, fourth-unit
prices for weak substitutes are also competitive: 29.5% of preference for 0 vs. 39.7% for 1.
34We could also use weaker or stronger definition of end-digit or round-number preferences to obtain
diﬀerent bounds for the empirical distributions of prices in each regime. We could, for example, assume that
in the strict complements regime second, third, and fourth unit prices within the same four-unit auction show
simultaneously a strong end-digit preference for 0 or 5. Our results are robust to include end-digit preference
for 5 as well.
Note that the strongest version of the empirical prediction is be that all second, third, and fourth prices
display an end-digit preference for 0 in any given four-unit auction for the same individual. A weaker version
would be that two out of the three (among second to fourth) prices show an end-digit preference for 0. The
weakest version is that just one of these three prices exhibit an end-digit preference for 0. The last (weakest)
specification only provides us an upper bound for strict complements regime identification since, as shown
in Table 3, the underlying distribution displays an end-digit preference for 0 even in the weak substitutes
regime.
35The figure looks similar if we use the second, or the third, or the fourth, or the average of second to
fourth prices.
36Using a modified version of this assumption that diﬀerentiates end-digit preference for prices ending in 0
that exhibit more frequency (for example, prices like 100 are more frequent than 150) yields almost identical
results.
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Note that, in column 3 (strict complements), the percentage of observations with last digit
0 is 100% by construction.
6 Estimation.
6.1 Econometric Specification.
We estimate the model via maximum likelihood using an exponential distribution for the
individual valuations. In this subsection we describe how the likelihood is formed and how
we account for rain expectations and auction heterogeneity.
Regime Determination. When goods are strict complements, very low prices—or, ac-
cording to the auctioneer who ran the auctions, symbolic prices (Botía, interview)— are
paid, by the winner of the first unit, for the second, third, and fourth units (Figure 2). The
predicted price pattern by our model for each each regime (strict complements and weak
substitutes) provides us with a straightforward empirical method to determine them (see
Section 5). This allows us to separate data into four categories:
a) Same bidder wins all four units and goods are in a strict complements regime (i.e.
when A1 and A2 hold),
b) Same bidder wins all four units and goods are in a weak substitutes regime (i.e. when
neither A1 nor A2 holds),
c) Last winner also bought two out of the first three units, three units in total, and goods
are in a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds),
d) Otherwise.
Categories a, b, and c define the three mutually exclusive regions of the likelihood. In
region a, winning prices are determined by equation 1. In region b, winning prices are
determined by equation 2. In region c, winning prices are determined by equation 3. Let Da
be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the winning price is in region a, and 0 otherwise.
Define analogously Db, Dc for regions b, and c, respectively (so Da + Db + Dc = 1). See
subsection 6.2 for a discussion about the regions of the likelihood and the covariates.
Identification. For the case of an English auction, the conditional distribution of private
valuations is non-parametrically identified when the transaction price and the number of
bidders are observable (Athey and Haile 2002). This result is immediately useful in our
sequential English auction model where bids are conditional-independent draws from a dis-
tribution FV (.) and the equilibrium (observed) transaction price is a function of the second
highest valuation, vN 1:N . Consider the strict complements regime. Winning prices are de-
termined by equation 1. The distribution of valuations is identified up to the multiplying
constant,
4P
k=1
⇢k, using equation 1 and the result from Athey and Haile 2002. Identification
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of the remaining parameters, ⇢k, would require four additional independent restrictions (in
addition to equation 1). Two additional restrictions are provided by the model from corollary
2 (equations 2 and 3). But we only observe winning bids in the data. Then, two of the ⇢k,
k = 1, . . . , 4, are not identified without further structure. So we use a specification with
linear decreasing marginal returns due to the mentioned data limitation. Linear decreas-
ing marginal returns impose two additional restrictions. First, we define ⇢1 = 1   ↵ and
⇢2 = 1   . (Note that these are not restrictions on the parameter space.) We then restrict
the parameter space by assuming that ⇢3 = 1   2  and ⇢4 = 1   3  (i.e. linear decreasing
marginal returns). Hence, we have three independent restrictions (equations 1, 2, and 3) and
three parameters to estimate (µ,↵,  ), where µ is a parameter that fully characterizes the
distribution of valuations.37 With observability of all bids (not just the winning bids as in
our empirical setting), ⇢3 and ⇢4 would be identified and we would not need to impose the
linearity assumption on marginal returns.38
Farmers’ Expectations of Future Rain. For our estimation we allow DMR,  t, to vary
across auctions holding fixed SC, ↵ (more about this below). We allow  t to vary with
farmers’ expectations of rain in each auction t = 1, . . . , T . We proxy these expectations by
actual (i.e. observed) future rain, so  t =  0+ 1RFt , where RFt is a dummy variable (defined
next) that is linked to expectations about future rain in t, and  0 and  1 are parameters.
RFt = 1 if farmers expect that rain is going to be positive (for the day for which they are
buying water) and zero otherwise. We further let  t have diﬀerent intercepts in each regime:
 St =  
S
0 +  
S
1R
F
t
 Ct =  
C
0 +  
C
1 R
F
t
. (4)
Table 6 provides an heuristic argument to understand the reasons behind this equation.
The table presents probit regressions of a dummy variable identifying the regime (strict
complements vs. weak substitutes) on future rain and other covariates. We interpret future
rain in these regressions as a proxy for aggregate expected future rain for the farmers. Table 6
shows that low expected rain and high demand months (May to August) significantly increase
the likelihood of being in a strict complements regime. The interpretation is that farmers
have some information (expectations) about future rain. While the idiosyncratic component
of this information is captured by their type, vi, the common component is captured by  t.
When farmers expect, on aggregate, no rain in a given day, they will coordinate to play in
the strict complements regime. Seasonality also aﬀects the demand for water and aﬀects the
position of a farmer in the production curve (Figure 10). The results in Table 6 show that it
is the slope on the marginal return eﬀect that drives the change of regime, holding fixed SC.
In our parametrization we fix ↵ across auctions and season but we allow  t to vary. We
37Note, however, that the distribution of private valuations is non-parametrically identified from the result
from Athey and Haile 2002.
38Note that assumptions A1 and A2 are equivalent to assume that ↵   4 .
21
expect ↵ to vary across auctions and seasons as well. But this variation is not separately
identified from the variation on  t because it is the relative magnitude of the eﬀects that
matters. The rationale for why we let  t vary (instead of ↵) is that a regime switch is driven
by the (residual) demand for water by the farmers, as determined by rain and seasonal eﬀects.
Therefore, the estimated changes in  t should be interpreted relative to changes with respect
to ↵.39
The Likelihood. The econometric problem consists of finding the parameter that char-
acterizes the common distribution of valuations F and the structural parameters that best
rationalize the bidding data. As discussed in the previous section, the bid levels at which
bidders drop out of the auctions are not observed, except the bidder with the second-highest
valuation. We estimate the model via maximum likelihood assuming that farmers draw in-
dependent and private valuations from an exponential distribution at each four-unit auction,
conditional on observed auction-specific covariates. (We discuss the assumptions below in
Subsection 6.2.)
Our model and the context of the market under analysis provide insight on how the
characteristics of farmers and auctions should aﬀect private values, but it oﬀers little guidance
on the functional form of this distribution. We assume that farmers’ valuations, vi, follow
an an exponential distribution for each four-unit auction.40 In Subsection 7 we report the
results from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test where the null hypothesis that the distribution of
private valuations are draws from an exponential distribution cannot be rejected.
Let vi ⇠ F (v;µ), where F (v;µ) = (1  e µv) 1 {v   0} is the CDF of an exponential
distribution that is characterized by the scalar µ > 0. Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 jointly
identify the parameter vector
 
µ,↵,  C0 ,  
S
0 ,  
C
1 ,  
S
1
 
, conditional on the regime (see Section
5) and exogenous covariates, RFt . The full system of equations is given by:41
39We obtained similar results to the ones on Tables 7 and 8 fixing   and allowing ↵t to vary in each auction
t = 1, . . . , T .
40In our earlier working paper Donna and Espin-Sanchez 2012 we used an Exponentiated Gamma (EG)
distribution The EG distribution gives us a closed-form solution for the PDF of the jth order statistic and is
characterized by a single parameter. Additionally, the PDF of the jth order statistic of a EG is a weighted
average of several PDF of EG. This implies that the PDF of any order statistic of an EG distribution also
has a closed-form solution.
41The third equation in the system is, actually, p4b = Max {(1  ↵)vN 1:N , (1   ) vN 2:N}, since we do
not know whether the runner-up in the last auction was the bidder who already won one unit or a bidder
without previous purchases. However, when N is large, (1   ↵)vN 1:N < (1   ) vN 2:N if   ' ↵. But, in
the case that   ' ↵, the same bidder will not win three out of four units. That is, in an auction where N
is large and the same bidder wins three out of four units, we expect   to be significantly greater than ↵.
Therefore, the equation can be simplified to p4b = (1  ↵)vN 1:N .
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4P
k=1
pka =
⇥
4  ↵  6 Ct
⇤
vN 1:N   3c
p4b = (1  ↵)vN 1:N   c
p4c = (1   St )vN 1:N   c
 St =  
S
0 +  
S
1R
F
t
 Ct =  
C
0 +  
C
1 R
F
t .
(5)
Let ✓ ⌘ (↵,  C0 ,  S0 ,  C1 ,  S1 ) and let vi be a conditional-independent draw from F (·;µ|✓, RFt ).
Then, the likelihood function is given by:
L(·;µ | ✓, RFt ) =
TY
t=1
fN 1:N
 P4
k=1 p
k
t
4  ↵  6( C0 +  C1 RFt )
;µ | ✓, RFt
!Dat
⇥
fN 1:N
 
p4t
1  ↵ ;µ | ✓, R
F
t
!Dbt
⇥ fN 1:N
 
p4t
1   S0 +  CS RFt
;µ | ✓, RFt
!Dct
,
(6)
where fN 1:N(v;µ) is the probability density function (PDF) of the (N   1)th order statis-
tic from a sample of N from the exponential distribution of valuations F , Dat +Dbt +Dct = 1
8t, and Dat , Dbt , Dct are, respectively, indicator variables for cases a, b, and c, as defined above
at the beginning of this subsection .
Auction Heterogeneity. We allow the mean of the distribution of valuations to depend
on various characteristics that are drawn from the data. We assume that observed prices
follow a linear function of the following exogenous variables and estimate all parameters
using the likelihood function:42
E
 
vit
 
= Z 0t  =  0 +  1R
P
t +  2
 
RPt
 2
+  3Nightt +
5X
k=2
 2+kDay
k
t +
12X
k=2
 6+kMonth
k
t . (7)
The first exogenous variable, RPt , refers to Past Rain, a moving average of the daily rain
beginning seven days prior to the date of the auction; we include a quadratic term to allow
for non linearities in past rain. The second variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the
water was bought for night use. The next four variables are a set of dummy variables for each
weekday. Finally, the last eleven variables are a complete set of monthly dummy variables to
condition on seasonality. Water prices soar in this market during the dry summer and drop in
42Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) assume that private values follow a log-normal distribution and let
the mean of the logarithm of the valuations be a linear function of exogenous characteristics. Haile and
Tamer (2003) condition on covariates by constructing the conditional empirical distribution functions using
Gaussian kernels. See Hickman, Hubbard, and Saglam (2011) for a recent guide to the literature on structural
econometric methods in auctions.
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winter. We accommodate these shocks to demand with seasonal monthly dummy variables.
See Sections D and E in the online appendix for details about the estimation procedure.
Identification and Estimation of Participation Costs. Although, throughout the pre-
vious estimation procedure, participation costs, c, have been fixed at an arbitrary small mag-
nitude, we recover them from our data. We use our model and data where auctions were run,
no bids observed and farmers were present, along with the structural estimates. Participation
costs are identified by the necessary condition for a bidder to bid in the first auction that is
given by:
(1  ↵)vN :N < c.
More generally, a condition that additionally involves second, third, and fourth marginal
utilities for the case where the bidder also enters the individual auctions for two, three or
four units should be considered. In these cases, participation costs are also greater than the
average marginal utility for second, third, and fourth units. Formally:
Max
⇢
(1  ↵), (2  ↵   t)
2
,
(3  ↵  2 t)
3
,
(4  ↵  3 t)
4
 
vN :N < c. (8)
Note that, when ↵ <  t, the former condition is suﬃcient, implying the latter. In our
econometric specification the structural parameter ↵ is fixed while the parameter  t varies
according to the farmers’ expectations of (exogenous) future rain. One would expect to
observe auctions without bids when farmers’ expectations for rain, as captured by actual
future rain, are high (which in the model is represented by a relatively high  t). Therefore,
absence of bids will only occur when ↵ <  t, thus, the former identification restriction is
suﬃcient.
Analogously, using the model and the remaining data not used in the structural estima-
tion, we obtain an upper bound using that participation cost are lower than the minimum
registered price (conditional on covariates, sunk cost, and decreasing marginal returns).
6.2 Discussion.
Conditional Independent Private Valuations (CIPV). For the estimation we assume
that farmers have independent and private valuations at each four-unit auction, conditional
on observed auction-specific covariates. The first justification for CIPV is that each bidding
farmer (who may or may not be a water-owner) has his own land extension, and his own
mixture of trees and crops. This eliminates a strict common value scenario. In addition, in
the econometric specification we account for observables that aﬀect all farmers in a similar
way such as (past and future) rainfall, schedule of the auction, day of the week, weather
seasonality, etc. (see subsection 6.1 for details). Second, the products sold are units of water.
Assuming that farmers have private information from other farmers about the characteristics
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of this product is not in line with the homogeneous nature of water units. Finally, the
conditional-independence assumption is the most credible in our context, given the varying
nature of farming products and soil conditions across farmers. To understand why, recall that
sellers in the water market are a holding formed by the water owners and buyers are farmers
that own fertile land. Around 500 diﬀerent farmers are observed to win auctions in our
sample. Not all of these farmers show up at every auction or decide to participate if they are
present. Farming products cultivated in the area are mainly fruit and citrus trees (lemon,
orange, peach, mandarin, and apricot), and vegetables (tomato, lettuce, and onion). The
amount of water required by the trees depends on the time of the year and type of crop (citrus
trees should not be irrigated daily). Moreover, and given that we condition on seasonality,
water requirements vary across products. For example, water needs for grapefruit and lemons
are about 20% higher than those for oranges, while water requirements for mandarins are
about 10% less. Ground conditions (which also vary across areas where diﬀerent farmers have
their land) also aﬀect water necessity.43 The variations across farmers generated by these
factors provide support for the fact that the conditional-independence assumption seems
satisfied, given that each day the market is quite specific and since we work with data for
four-consecutive auctions as a unit of analysis (sequential auctions).44
Auction Heterogeneity. Observed heterogeneity across auctions arises due to seasonal
eﬀects, rain, and the day and time of the week when the auction occurs. This means that
the distribution of private values for the tth auction, Ft(·) is not constant across auctions.
In our estimation, we recover the family of distributions F (·|Zt,  ). That is, we assume for
every four-unit auction that Ft(·) = F (·|Zt,  ), where   2 Rk is a parameter vector and Zt is
a vector of fully observed characteristics describing the environment of the tth auction. We
described the inclusion of these covariates above.
Number of Potential Bidders. The number of potential bidders in each auction, Nt,
is not observed. Moreover, it is not identified (Athey and Haile 2002). We assume that it
is constant for every four-unit auction, Nt = N . Table 5 displays the timing structure for
diﬀerent bidders in our sample. For our estimation, we let the number of potential bidders
in each auction be the yearly average of diﬀerent farmers who won auctions in our sample.45
43Table A3 in the online appendix displays appropriate intervals for watering citrus.
44Our justification of the CIPV paradigm is in line with the literature on empirical auctions. For first price
descending auctions see, for example, Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) in an application to agricultural
products (greenhouse eggplants in Marmande, France) where the number of bidders vary between 11 and
18. For English auctions, Haile and Tamer (2003) apply their limited structure model to U.S. Forest Service
timber auctions, where the number of bidders vary from 2 to 12.
45The agricultural products that are cultivated in the area are mainly citrus trees, which are harvested
once per year. The number of diﬀerent bidders who bought at least one unit during a specific year constitutes
a good approximation of the number of farmers who were actively bidding in each four-unit auction during
that year. The monthly average of diﬀerent bidders who bought water in the sample (years 1954 to 1966) is
8.31 (Table 5).
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We estimate the model using diﬀerent values of N for robustness.46
Unobserved Heterogeneity. Throughout, we have assumed that the vector Zt of covari-
ates is fully observed by the econometrician. In our environment, unobserved heterogeneity
implies that the distribution of bids may not be conditional-independent across t. All farmers
may, for example, observe some factor unobservable by the researcher that shifts the location
of the distribution values. This unobserved heterogeneity could lead to correlation among
bidders’ valuations, causing an identification problem and inconsistent estimates to arise.47
Modeling unobserved heterogeneity may require additional assumptions on the behavior of
unobservables, such as independence, separability, strict monotonicity, and is beyond the
scope of this paper.48
Dynamic Strategic Considerations. The way in which the auction system is carried
out every week raises the question of the importance of dynamic strategic considerations
between four-unit auctions both among days (Monday to Friday for a specific schedule) and
between schedules (day-time vs night-time for a specific day). Tables 1 and 2 show that
winning prices decline across days (for a given schedule) and at night (for a given day),
which is consistent with the literature on empirical sequential auctions. These dynamic
strategic considerations are outside the scope of the present investigation, and we abstract
from them in the model.49 However, it is important to note that, even if present, dynamic
behavior considerations do not invalidate the model’s assumptions. As emphasized above,
the conditional-independent units of analysis are four-unit auctions (not day-auctions of
eight units or week-auctions of 40 units) which, conditional on covariates, are homogeneous
goods. As can be seen from the correlations presented in Table 2, previous patterns are
consistent along the whole sample and robust to the inclusion of a whole set of fixed eﬀects
and covariates. The principal diﬀerence between prices in these four-unit auctions is related
to the uncertainty of future rain. As it is explained above, we include covariates for schedule,
day-of-the-week, and past rain in our structural estimation that capture technological or
strategic eﬀects. Future rain, on the other hand, is also included as a proxy for farmers’
46In Table 7 we present the results for N 2 {8, 10}. We have performed a sensitivity analysis to diﬀerent
values of Nt that are consistent with the pattern observed in Table 5 and the evidence described in Section
3. In addition, we broke the sample into four periods and performed the estimation independently in each
period allowing the mean value of Nt to vary by period. We obtained similar results to the ones reported in
Table 7.
47From the agricultural census data we observe individual characteristics of the farmers which we are able
to link to the winning bids. Given the structure of the agricultural water market we are modeling, it does not
appear to be an important concern once we consider the homogeneity of the selling good and the observed
characteristics we introduce in our estimations (seasonality, past and future rain, among others).
48For a discussion on this issue see, among others, Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) for an application to tim-
ber auctions, and Krasnokutskaya (2011) for a semi-parametric approach to Michigan highway procurement
contracts. Roberts (2009) uses information contained in reserve prices to allow bidders’ private signals to
depend on the realization of the unobserved heterogeneity. Balat (2013) allows for unobserved heterogeneity
using dynamic auctions in the highway procurement market.
49For a broader discussion see Donna and Espin-Sanchez 2013a.
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beliefs to account for these possible strategic behaviors unaccounted by previous covariates.
In that sense, our estimates should be interpreted as four-unit day-schedule specific auctions,
conditional on past rain and seasonality. It seems implausible that after accounting for these
observables and unobservables,50 and given that the relevant unit of analysis is the four-unit
auction, dynamic behavior would aﬀect our results concerning individual demand.51
Regions of the Likelihood and Covariates. Another concern may be selection in the
regions of the likelihood. As emphasized in subsection 6.1, categories a, b, and c define the
three mutually exclusive regions of the likelihood. (In region a, winning prices are determined
by equation 1. In region b, winning prices are determined by equation 2. In region c, winning
prices are determined by equation 3.) Table A4 in the online appendix displays a comparison
of the covariates in the three regions of the likelihood. As expected, prices are higher in
the strict complements regime (region a) relative to the weak substitutes regime (regions b
and c). This is because the amount of rainfall is lower under the strict complements regime
(region a) relative to the weak substitutes regime (regions b and c). Rainfall is lower in region
a) (relative to regions b and c) due to weather seasonalities: the percentage of observations in
Apr-May (when the agricultural products need the water the most) is substantially higher in
region a) (strict complements) relative to regions b) and c) (weak substitutes). The opposite
is true during the low demand season (Jan-Mar and Oct-Dec). Finally, note that there is no
substantial variation (between the strict complement and weak substitutes regimes) in terms
of the percentage of observations by Schedule (day or night) and Weekday (Mo, Tu, We, Th,
and Fr).
7 Results.
7.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates.
In this section we present the estimation results under various econometric specifications.
We present the structural estimates obtained using a tolerance level of 1.0e   12. We let
private valuations for each four-unit auction follow an exponential distribution, and follow the
described estimation procedure. As discussed above, the number of bidders, N , is determined
by the monthly average of diﬀerent bidders who bought water in the sample (years 1954 to
1966). In this 13-year sample, the average is slightly above 8. Each of these farmers regularly
won auctions. It is reasonable to assume that they attended the auctions. Tables 7 and 8
present our estimation results. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the estimates for N = 8, while
50While farmers use their reasonable good predictions in their decisions, we use actual future rainfall in
our estimation.
51Once we condition on these covariates, the concern that a bidder’s outside option would vary according
to the day of the week (or schedule) is addressed by redefining the idiosyncratic individual valuation in such
a way that the new one be the original valuation net of the outside option. By normalizing the outside option
of Friday-night to zero the model’s assumptions remain valid.
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columns 2, 4, and 6 do it for N = 10.52 For each specification, we present the estimates of
the model’s structural parameters in Table 7 and the estimates of the covariates in Table 8.
Table 8 is the continuation of Table 7. That is, for each specification (column) in Table 7,
Table 8 displays the estimates of the covariates in that specification.
All parameters have the expected signs. We use the estimate of the parameter   (that
characterizes the distribution of private valuations), to compute the mean valuation of the
first complete unit of water. In the case of column 3, the value of the first complete unit of
water is 152.93 ptas. As expected, in the specification in column 4 (with 10 diﬀerent bidders),
the mean value of the first complete unit of water is slightly lower, 138.9 ptas.
The parameter  R1 , R 2 {C, S} captures the eﬀect of future rain. As farmers’ expectations
of future rain increase, DMR are more severe ( R1 > 0, R 2 {C, S}). This increases farmers’
likelihood of coordinating in a not-strict complements regime (see Table 6) and thus reduces
their valuation of subsequent units of water ( @p
i
t
@RFt
< 0). Predicted DMR are obtained by
adding the estimates of intercepts,  ˆR0 , R 2 {C, S}, to the estimates of the slope,  ˆR1 , R 2
{C, S}, conditional on the rain on the day of the auction. When evaluated at the average
future rain from each regime, the following null hypothesis (joint test) that overall DMR are
lower in the strict complements regime (as predicted by the model) cannot be rejected (p-
value above 10%). H0 :  ˆS0 +  ˆS1 Eˆs(RFt ) >  ˆC0 +  ˆC1 Eˆc(RFt ), where Eˆs(RFt ) = 1Ts
P
t:Dat=0
RFt ,
Eˆc(RFt ) = 1Tc
P
t:Dat=1
RFt , Ts, and Tc are the number of auctions in not-strict complements
and strict complements regimes, respectively.
The estimates of the SC parameter, ↵, are statistically significant in all specifications.
Given the choice of parametrization for sunk costs, the parameter estimates can be interpreted
as the percentage loss in terms of a complete unit of water (Section 4). For our estimate in
column 3 this represents a loss of 4.6 ptas (using the mean value of 152.9 ptas for a complete
unit).
The estimated coeﬃcients for covariates have the expected sign. For specification 3,
for instance, prices in August (February) are significantly 234 ptas higher (11 ptas lower)
than on January. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that water is more (less)
valuable during these months because of high (low) water demand. Also as expected, past
rain decreases observed prices in the data. For specification in column 3, an increase in the
average rainfall by 1 mm from the previous week (with respect to the day of irrigation),
decreases average conditional price of a unit of water by 1.7 ptas.
52In their simulated Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS) estimation, Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995)
search for the best value of N by minimizing a lack-of-fit criterion (proposition 4). Note that, as discussed in
Subsection 6.1, identification of the distribution of valuations and structural parameters of our model requires
observation of the total number of bidders. The rationale for this is straightforward: whether second highest
realization of the random variable vi is from a sample of size N = 10, or from a sample of size N = 100, it is
crucial to interpret the second highest bid (observable in our data). Although observation of an additional
order statistic can eliminate this requirement (Song 2004), this would require imposing further structure on
the distribution of beliefs in our model (to interpret auctions where, for example, three diﬀerent farmers win
auctions), which is outside the scope of this investigation. Moreover, we only observe winning bids in the
data (see Section 3).
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Participation cost are recovered using data where auctions were run with farmers present,
but no bids were placed, along with the identifying restriction that holds in such cases.53
Out of the 3, 203 auctions where no bids were placed, we use the 2, 423 where some bidders
where present (auctions similar to the one in Figure 12). We obtain the following interval
estimate using specification 3: 0.0082 < cˆ < 0.1431. That is, participation costs are positive
but small (less than 14 cents of a peseta). This is in line with the intuition from the model:
hassle or opportunity costs because farmers value their time.
7.2 Discussion.
Robustness and Goodness of the Fit. In comparing columns 1-2 and 3-4, it is clear
that the model with covariates outperforms the model without, as shown by the significance
of past rain and seasonal dummy estimates, the increase in the likelihood function, and the
improvement in the goodness of the fit. The main reason is the dependence of prices on sea-
sonal factors, which we capture in our specification with seasonal dummy variables. From the
residual analysis we find no evidence that the increase in the log likelihood function is due to
the parametric misspecification of the value distribution itself. Our specification survives the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, so that the exponential distribution of private valuations cannot
be rejected (for the specification in column 3 the p-value of the test is 39%).54
As regards the goodness-of-fit, our specification in column 3 performs quite well. The
pseudo R2 = 53% is obtained by computing predicted prices by our model: pseudo R2 =
1  
PT
t=1(pt pˆt)2PT
t=1(pt p¯)2
, where pˆt are prices predicted by the model and p¯ is the mean of prices.
These results are in line with the R2 obtained in the reduced-form regressions. Although
not directly comparable given the distribution assumptions in the structural approach, the
R2 = 23% in the reduced-form specification with all covariates (column 3 in Table 2) can be
heuristically interpreted as the proportion of variability in the data set that is accounted for
by the covariates. The proportion accounted for by the model without covariates displayed
in column 1 in Table 7 is R2 = 28%.55 As can be seen in Figure 13, our model allows
us to follow winning prices accurately.56 The figure displays real prices against predicted
prices using three diﬀerent models: (i) our structural model (specification 3 in Table 7), (ii)
a standard English auction model (specification 5 in Table 7, that we discuss in the next
subsection), and (iii) a reduced-form model (specification 4 from Table 2 that includes as
regressors Past Rain and multiple fixed eﬀects, including individual fixed eﬀects).
53See page 24.
54We perform the nonparametric test to evaluate the equality of two distributions of valuations: our sample
of private values with a reference from an exponential distribution.
55If we additionally add individual fixed eﬀects to the reduced-form specification, the R2 just increases
from 23% to 36% (column 4 in Table 2).
56We describe how we compute the predicted prices in section C in the online appendix. See also section
C in the online appendix for a high definition version of this figure.
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Understanding the Importance of the Model. We proceed now to analyze our model’s
implications with respect to the importance of SC and DMR. Suppose that the researcher
neglects the dynamics that arise from the model and, instead, estimates a standard English
auction model. Suppose, for instance, that we are in the strict complements regime and
that valuations follow a distribution with mean, µv, and standard deviation,  v. Then, the
estimated mean of the distribution of valuations using the standard model will be underesti-
mated: ˆE (vi)
SM
< E (vi) = µv, where SM stands for standard model. Similarly, the estima-
tion of the standard deviation of valuations will be overestimated: ˆV (vi)
SM
> V (vi) =  v.57
The same is true in the weak substitutes case.
Overestimation of the variance of the distribution is caused by attributing the variation
in prices (among diﬀerent units) to a relatively more dispersed underlying distribution. The
farmer actually pays for the whole bundle in the first unit, thus deterring the entrance of other
bidders in the remaining three auctions. The mean is underestimated when the common SC
and DMR are not accounted for in the estimation. In the case of the exponential distribution
used in our specifications, this failure translates into an underestimation of the parameter µ.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 7 present the estimates from a standard English (button)
auction. Aside from the mentioned bias in the parameter that characterizes the distribution,
the results in these columns indicate that taking SC and DMR into account significantly
contributes to the model’s explanatory power. Figure 13 shows predicted prices from the
standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Table 7), and compares them
with actual prices and with those from our structural model (specification 3 in Table 7).58
Consistent with these results, the p-value for the null hypothesis that ↵ˆ =  ˆC0 =  ˆS0 =  ˆC1 =
 ˆS1 = cˆ = 0 is less than 10 4.
An alternative approach is to ask how the incomplete model from Haile and Tamer (2003)
can be adapted to the present case.59 This alternative approach relies on two basic assump-
tions with intuitive appeal: (i) bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay for a
unit, and (ii) bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat.
In our case, with SC and DMR, these two simple assumptions are violated. In the strict
complements regime, bidders bid according to b1i (vi) = [4  ↵  6 ] vi   4c > vi, violating
(i), and no bidder (except the highest type) participates in the second to fourth unit auc-
tions, violating (ii). In the non weak substitutes regime, both assumptions are also violated,
though the intuition is diﬀerent. In this case, the equilibrium is only partially revealing:
bidders’ strategies are step functions, so the equilibrium is semi-pooling. When ↵ is greater
but close to  , bidders bid above their valuations to intimidate other bidders and deter entry
57In the strict complements case, and given a fixed number of potential bidders N , the (true) mean and
variance of the N   1 order statistic will be greater than the estimated using the standard model because
the (true) price paid will be [4  ↵  6 t,c] vN 1:N   4c and not 4vN 1:N (predicted by the standard model).
58See footnote 56.
59Larsen (2013) uses a similar approach to Haile and Tamer to obtain bounds about the primitives in an
auction model followed by dynamic bargaining with two-sided incomplete information without solving for
the equilibrium of the game.
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in the second auction, thus (i) is violated. Additionally, the same argument as in Black and
De Meza (1992) and Liu (2011) applies when goods are substitutes. The winner of the first
auction imposes a negative externality on himself. His willingness to pay for the second unit
is lower than it was for the first unit, making him a weaker bidder in such situations. Given
that all bidders will internalize this eﬀect, some will bid below their marginal utility for the
object in the first auction. The greater are DMR,  , the greater this underbidding eﬀect will
be.
Applying these assumptions to the four-units bundle would not to produce informative
bounds because marginal valuations of the units diﬀer according to the regime and the
number of diﬀerent winners per four-unit auction. Bundling the four-unit or even applying
Haile and Tamer’s approach separately for each regime, requires the model in Section 4 as
an interpretation of the underlying behavior.60
Complementarities are not Collusion. An alternative hypothesis of farmers’ behav-
ior in the strict complements regime is that bidders might be playing some collusive (non-
competitive) strategy. As emphasized in Section 3, the demand side of this market for water
is composed of as many as hundreds of farmers (Table 5). Even when farmers attend the
auction and do not bid, the observed number of diﬀerent winners is relatively high (Figure
12). (Note that all auctions were run in weeks similar to the one in Figure 12, so water for
units 17-20 was available in the dam to sell.) Farmers compete for water that will ultimately
determine the quality and quantity of their crop, and in some cases, even the survival of
their trees (for example, drought years). It is unlikely that farmers can make credible col-
lusive commitments in such a situation. Contemporaries emphasized the opposite situation:
farmers competed aggressively for water,especially during droughts, while water owners were
reluctant to lower the price of the water to meet the needs of the poorest farmers.61
The high number of non-collusive auctions provides evidence farmers did not collude.
Farmers met every week, hence the discount rate from one week to the next one was close
to 1. If we focus on two consecutive 4-unit auctions, the discount rate is virtually 1. Thus,
any collusive agreement would be easy to sustain and we would observe no “price-wars”, or
deviations from collusive strategies. If the collusion hypothesis were true, all auctions would
look collusive except, perhaps, during certain periods where we would observe price-wars.
We observe in many cases, however, that both regimes are present during the same week.
Unlike Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) this is not a formal test.62
Nevertheless, taking the analysis one step further, if the collusion hypothesis were true, we
would expect more collusion in autumn-winter and less collusion in spring-summer. Incentives
60Note also that failure to consider the eﬀect of the structural parameters (SC and DMR) explicitly intro-
duces diﬃculties.
61These opinions, along with a qualitative analysis can be found in Vera Nicolás (2004).
62Collusion in repeated auctions has been analyzed conditional (Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz 2004) and
unconditional (Porter and Zona 1999 and Pesendorfer 2000) on the history of the game. A discussion on how
to detect collusion can be found in Porter (2005).
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to deviate from the collusion strategy are higher in spring-summer because the value of
the water is higher due to seasonalities (Figures 4 and 7). Punishment is about the same
in any season. The maximum punishment would be to play the competitive equilibrium
forever. Future discounted earnings in this case are similar in summer and in winter. Hence,
deviating from the collusive strategy is more profitable in summer than in winter. However,
the data show the opposite pattern. Figure 14 displays the distribution of auctions in the
complementarities regime by month. Complementarities are more likely to be observed in
summer than in winter, when water requirements (and hence equilibrium prices) soar. This
is in line with our interpretation according to the model with sunk and entry costs.
A “competitive” collusion? We have implicitly assumed that farmers’ plots were spaced
suﬃciently far apart from each other. Specifically, we assumed that no other farmer could
use the same sub-channel just used by his neighbor. In reality, this assumption is not true for
all cases. Because the cost of watering the sub-channel is sunk, if the plots of two farmers are
located next to each other and they share the same sub-channel, then one farmer could free-
ride and outbid the first winner in the second auction. Knowing this, the first winner would
bid lower in the first auction. This situation would reduce the revenue of the auction and
create ineﬃciencies. Since farmers might not internalize this free-riding eﬀect, they would
take into account the equilibrium outcome for the remaining auctions, and lower their bid in
the first auction. They would then will try to outbid their neighbors in later auctions.
In a situation such as this, it would be relatively easy to sustain a collusive agreement
among neighboring farmers. The number of members of the coalition would be small (say,
three or four farmers), and because they are neighbors, they would know each other well
and might even share animals or machinery for agricultural purposes. Each farmer in the
coalition would compete in the auction for the first unit, but would not enter the remaining
auctions if one member of the coalition won the first unit. With this agreement they would
achieve eﬃciency by solving the free riding problem. With the resulting increase in eﬃciency,
the revenue of the auction would also increase, and the auctioneer would not be opposed to
the “collusion”. This situation would not aﬀect our results unless farmers coordinated bidding
rings to not outbid neighboring farmers in the first auction.63 64
63It will only aﬀect the outcome when both the bidder with the highest valuation and the bidder with the
second highest valuation belong to the same ring, but the bidder with the third highest valuation belongs
to a diﬀerent ring. In this case, our model predicts that the observed price is the valuation of the second
highest bidder, but it actually corresponds to the valuation of the third highest bidder. This is unlikely in
our empirical setting because the nearly 500 farmers would form around 150 rings (based on the geographical
locations that we obtained from the census data). The probability that the two bidders with the highest
valuation belong to the same ring is virtually zero. Moreover, the diﬀerence between the second highest and
the third highest valuation will be small in any case.
64There is an extensive literature on the theory of bidding cartels (for example, Graham and Marshall
1987; Hendricks, Porter, and Guofu (2008); Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz (2004); and McAfee and McMillan
1992). For English auctions, Asker (2010) empirically investigates a bidding cartel of collectable stamps. See
Harrington (2008) for a survey.
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Eﬃciency. The model displayed in Section 4 assumes that it is costly for the bidders to
enter the auction. In order to compare the sequential ascending price auction with other
mechanisms, this entry cost has to be taken into account. In this context, and following
Stegeman (1996), we interpret entry cost as the cost farmers incur when they send a message
to the auctioneer, or to some other farmers. Here, the notions of ex-ante and ex-post eﬃciency
are no longer equivalent. Although it may be ex-ante eﬃcient that more than one player
sends a message, it is always ex-post eﬃcient that at most one player sends a message.
For this case where it is costly to send messages to the coordinator, Stegeman shows
that the ascending price auction has an equilibrium that is ex-ante eﬃcient. In contrast,
the first-price auction may have no eﬃcient equilibrium, and the author only considers the
single-unit case. In our sequential unit case, we have shown that when goods are strict
complements the analysis is identical to the single unit case. Hence, the result applies here
as well. However, when goods are weak substitutes, the result only applies to the last auction.
Although outside the scope of this paper, further work to investigate whether a sequential
ascending price auction is ex-post eﬃcient when the coordinator has to allocate several objects
to players that face SC, DMR, and costly messages, would be a useful extension.
8 Conclusions.
By aﬀecting bidders’ behavior in sequential auctions, sunk costs and decreasing marginal
returns in the presence of participation costs generate very diﬀerent price dynamics within
the same market. This diﬀerence in price dynamics is attributable to the varying extent
to which the value of sequential goods complements or falls relative to previous units. The
deterrence eﬀect, whereby the same bidder pays a high price for the first unit (deterring others
from entering subsequent auctions), and a low price for the remaining units, arises when
sunk costs are relatively high compared to the decreasing marginal returns, thus creating
complementarities among the goods. Substitutability arises due to decreasing returns when
sunk costs are relatively small. In this case, equilibrium prices are similar in magnitude,
regardless of whether the same or diﬀerent bidders win the objects. Careful consideration
of these features is fundamental to demand characterization, a cornerstone of many positive
and normative questions in economics.
Using a novel data set from a decentralized market institution that operated privately for
eight centuries in southern Spain, we document these price dynamics and develop a model
to recover the underlying structural parameters and distribution of valuations. Although
the bidders are better informed than the sellers in our model, the latter know that the se-
quential English auction allocates water (ex-ante) eﬃciently. Not requiring farmers to reveal
their marginal valuations is an advantage of the mechanism, whose simplicity reduces costs
associated with its implementation and helps explain its stability. We address three main
questions. Are water units complements or substitutes, and why? Is the deterrence eﬀect
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consistent with a competitive market structure or a consequence of collusive behavior among
farmers? What would happen to the estimates in this setting if the researcher, by ignoring
the importance of participation and sunk costs, failed to account for the complementarity
feature of the sequential goods?
First we document that during the period under study both complementarities and sub-
stitutabilities are observed in the data, generating diﬀerent price dynamics. Seasonality,
related to the water requirements of the crops and the expected rainfall, aﬀects the relative
importance of sunk costs and decreasing returns, causing bidders to coordinate their actions
in these regimes. Second, the apparent collusive behavior, when the same bidder wins all
the goods, paying very low prices for all the units following the first unit, is actually com-
petitive (or non-cooperative). Contrary to the collusion hypothesis, this behavior is caused
by complementarities, and is observed when the value of water (as well as the average price
paid per unit and, thus, the incentive to deviate from a collusion strategy) increases relative
to the standard competitive pattern registered in the weak substitutes regime. This shows
the importance of interpreting the data through the economic model. Finally, by estimating
our model, we confirm the relevance of participation and sunk costs in our empirical environ-
ment. By testing the performance of our model relative to a standard English auction model
without participation costs, we confirm that estimations using the latter are not accurate.
Aside from the bias generated by ignoring sunk costs and decreasing returns, price dynamics
play an important role, as it is not appropriate to attribute the variation in prices among
sequential units (when the goods are complements) to a relatively more disperse underlying
distribution of valuations.
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Figure 1: Auction Sample: Goods Are Substitutes
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Pedro Fernández 123
Mo2 Pedro Fernández 1113 Pedro Fernández 111
4 Pedro Fernández 109
5 Pedro Blaya 115
Tu6 Jose Ruiz 1167 Mauricio Gutiérrez 117
8 Mauricio Gutiérrez 106
9 Ambrosio Ortíz 116
We10 Ambrosio Ortíz 10011 Ambrosio Ortíz 100
12 Carlota Pomares 116
13 Eliseo Gutiérrez 120
Th14 Antonio Muñoz 11215 Antonio Navarro 110
16 Vicente Ledesma 106
17 Jose Gálvez 103
Fr18 Juan Martínez 9119 Juan Martínez 90
20 Jesus Gutiérrez 100
Sample from original data obtained from the historical archive: Goods Are Substitutes (Winter - February 18, 1955, Day). Units
1 to 4 are the units bought on Monday (Mo) during day (unit 1 corresponds to right to irrigate from 7AM to 10AM, unit 2
from 10AM to 1PM, unit 3 from 1PM to 4PM, and unit 4 from 4PM to 7PM). Similarly, units 5 to 8 are the units bought on
Tuesday (Tu) during day; units 9 to 12 are the units on Wednesday (We) during day; units 13 to 16 are the units on Thursday
(Th) during day; and units 17 to 20 are the units on Friday (Fr) during day.
Figure 2: Auction Sample: Goods Are Complements
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Juana Fernández 1580
Mo2 Juana Fernández 503 Juana Fernández 50
4 Juana Fernández 50
5 Francisco Gabarrón 1401
Tu6 Francisco Gabarrón 507 Francisco Gabarrón 50
8 Francisco Gabarrón 50
9 Jose Fernández 1401
We10 Jose Fernández 2511 Jose Fernández 25
12 Jose Fernández 25
13 Antonio Belijar Boluda 1401
Th14 Antonio Belijar Boluda 2515 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
16 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
17 Manuel Gutiérrez 1406
Fr18 Manuel Gutiérrez 5019 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
20 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
Sample from original data obtained from the historical archive: Goods Are Complements (Summer - July 22, 1966, Day). See
notes in Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Sample of Individual Data Obtained from the Agricultural Census
Sample Card from a Farmer Obtained from the Agricultural Census. Individual characteristics include:
farmers’ name (that we match to the names in the auctions), type of land and location, area, number of
trees, production and the price at which this production was sold in the census year.
Figure 4: Rain and Frequency Distribution of 4CU Over the Sample Period
The figure displays for each month: i) the number of auctions where the same farmer wins all four consecutive
units, and ii) total rain using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression (of ’total rain’ on ’month of the year’)
with an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth selected by cross validation.
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Figure 5: Winning Prices: by Number of Consecutive Units Bought by the Same Farmer and
by Unit
The figure displays price variation from the raw data (for the whole sample) disaggregated by:
i) Top Panel: Number of consecutive units won by the same farmer (1, 2, 3, and 4; note that we called them
1CU, 2CU, 3CU, and 4CU in Tables A1 in the online and appendix and in table1).
ii) Bottom Panel: further disaggregating each vertical box from the Top Panel by unit (First Unit, Second
Unit, Third unit, and Fourth unit). Note that 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate the number of consecutive units won
by the same farmer (same as in the graph in the top).
Each vertical box (unit) displays the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge),
median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
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Figure 6: Winning Prices: by Weekday, Hour and Schedule
The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by: i) Unit (First Unit in Blue, Second Unit in Red,
Third Unit in Green, and Fourth Unit in Orange); Weekday (Mo=Monday, Tu=Tuesday, We=Wednesday,
Th=Thursday, and Fr=Friday); and Schedule (Day=Day-Time and Night=Night-Time). Thus, the figure
displays the distribution of prices of each of the 40 units auctioned per week for the whole sample (disag-
gregated by Unit, Weekday, and Schedule). Each vertical box (unit) displays the maximum price (upper
adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge),
and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
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Figure 7: Price and Seasonality
The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by season. Each vertical box displays the maximum
price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile
(lower hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
Figure 8: Winning Prices: by Season and Drought
The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by: i) Season and Drought Indicator. Each vertical box
displays the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median, 25th percentile
(lower hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value). We define a drought as an indicator that equals one
when average monthly rain during the specific year is below a consensus threshold defined in the literature
in terms of the historic annual average (following Gil Olcina 1994 we use a threshold of 40%). The numbers
below each box correspond to the percentage (in terms of the whole sample) of observations in each box (i.e.
al these numbers sum up to 100% ).
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Figure 9: The Channel System in Mula and the Sunk Cost of Initiating the Irrigation
The main canal (left panel) was made of concrete. The individual sub-channels (right panel) were dug into
the ground. Thus, in these sub-channels, a water loss is incurred because water flows over a dry sub-channel
(some water is absorbed by the ground).
Figure 10: Marginal Returns of Irrigation Water
Marginal returns of water in summer (left) and autumn (right).
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Figure 11: Within Price Distribution by Regime: First Price vs. Median Second to Fourth
prices
Both figures display, for instances when the same farmer won all four units in a 4-unit auction, the normalized
percentage change,  , of the first winning price against the median of the second to fourth winning prices:
  = p1 m(p1+m)/2 , with m = median (p2, p3, p4). Note that   < 2 and that   ! 2 if, and only if, p1 ! 1, or
m ! 0, or both; i.e. when the percentage change goes to infinity. In the figure on the left, Lower Bound
is computed by assuming that all second, third, and fourth unit prices paid by the (same) farmer within
the same four-unit auction display end-price preference for 0. In the figure on the right, Upper Bound is
computed by assuming that only one among second, third, or fourth unit prices paid by the (same) farmer
within the same four-unit auction display end-price preference for 0.
Figure 12: Auction Sample: Auction where Farmers Are Present and No Bids Are Placed
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Sebastian Aguilar 48
Mo2 Felipe Amaro 423 Felipe Amaro 48
4 Diego Guirao 50
5 Felipe Amaro 54
Tu6 Antonio Llamas 517 Cristóbal Romero 47
8 Cristóbal Romero 50
9 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 2
We10 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 511 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 1
12 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 1
13 Luis Moya 2.75
Th14 Luis Moya 115 Luis Moya 1
16 Luis Moya 1
17
Fr1819
20
Sample from original data obtained from the historical archive: Auction where farmers are present and no
bids are placed (Winter - January 22, 1954, Day).
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Figure 13: Winning and Estimated Prices
The figure displays real prices against predicted prices using three diﬀerent models: (i) our structural model (specification 3 in
Table 7), (ii) a standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Table 7), and (iii) a reduced-form model for the
sample using as regressors: Past Rain, unit (3 dummy variables), weekday (4 dummy variables), schedule (1 dummy variable),
month (11 dummy variables), year (12 dummy variables), and individual fixed eﬀects, in addition to a constant (for details
about the reduced-form specification see Table 2 discussed in Subsection 3.3). The graph shows the mean monthly averages of
the prices. Similar results are obtained using a spline (available in our earlier working paper Donna and Espin-Sanchez 2012).
See Section C in the online appendix for a high definition version of this figure.
Figure 14: Regime Frequency Disaggregation by Month
The figure depicts the frequency of auctions where the same farmer buys all four consecutive units (4CU), by regime (see Section
3) and month. (Note that the sum of 4CU over months and regimes—the vertical lines in the graph—is equal to 1470 = 5880/4.
See Table 1 in the paper and Table A1 in the online appendix.) It can be seen that complementarities are more likely to
be observed in summer than in winter, where water requirements (and, hence, equilibrium prices) soar. We interpret this as
evidence in favor of the competition hypothesis (according to our model with entry and sunk costs) and against the collusion
hypothesis.
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Table 1: Distribution of Winning Prices: by Number of CU and Sequential Auction
Panel 1: Price distribution by number of consecutive bids: All Auctions
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 101 218.2 327.9 3000 0.05 3530
2CU 123 256.7 364.6 2700 0.05 2866
3CU 190 320.0 415.5 4050 0.05 1716
4CU 182 339.9 470.2 4830 0.05 5880
Panel 2: Price distribution by number of consecutive bids: First Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 100 211.1 304.1 2921 0.05 977
2CU 150 305.0 427.8 2700 0.05 673
3CU 220.5 410.0 512.5 4050 0.05 382
4CU 451 677.6 689.5 4830 0.05 1470
Panel 3: Price distribution by number of consecutive bids: Second Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 93.25 219.8 373.0 3000 0.10 624
2CU 103.5 230.2 328.0 2685 0.05 867
3CU 181 294.9 364.7 2850 0.05 539
4CU 101 242.7 309.3 2605 0.05 1470
Panel 4: Price distribution by number of consecutive bids: Third Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 94 200.8 312.3 2357 0.10 715
2CU 126.5 256.5 353.9 2601 0.10 778
3CU 151.5 285.55 379.0 2801 0.05 536
4CU 100 229.2 294.2 2701 0.05 1470
Panel 5: Price distribution by number of consecutive bids: Fourth Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 114.5 233.4 330.2 2601 0.05 1214
2CU 113.5 239.6 344.8 2601 0.10 548
3CU 167 311.6 411.6 2630 0.05 259
4CU 100 210.1 272.6 2935 0.05 1470
Panel 6: Price distribution for 4CU
Auction Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1st to 4th 182 339.9 470.2 4830 0.05 5880
1st 451 677.6 689.5 4830 0.05 1470
2nd 101 242.7 309.3 2605 0.05 1470
3rd 100 229.2 294.2 2701 0.05 1470
4th 100 210.1 272.6 2935 0.05 1470
1st and 2nd 253 460.2 576.9 4830 0.05 2940
2nd and 3rd 101.0 235.9 301.9 3001 0.05 2940
3rd and 4th 100.0 219.7 283.7 2935 0.05 2940
1st to 3rd 200.0 383.2 512.4 4830 0.05 4410
2nd to 4th 100.0 227.3 292.7 3001 0.05 4410
The table displays the Distribution of Winning Prices. Panels 1 to 5 presents the Distribution of Prices disaggregated by cases
where the same farmer buys one, two, three, or four consecutive units (1CU, 2CU, 3CU, or 4CU, respectively). Panel 1 presents
the Distribution of Prices for All Auctions (i.e. First, Second, Third, and Fourth Auctions). Panel 2 presents the Distribution of
Prices for First Auctions. Panel 3 presents the Distribution of Prices for Second Auctions. Panel 4 presents the Distribution of
Prices for Third Auctions. Panel 5 presents the Distribution of Prices for Fourth Auctions. Finally, Panel 6 presents Distribution
of Prices just for 4CU (i.e. for the subsample of 5880 auctions where the same farmer won all four consecutive units). Note
that the first line in Panel 6 (1st to 4th) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 1 (4CU). The second line in
Panel 6 (1st) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 2 (4CU). The third line in Panel 6 (2nd) displays the same
information as the last line in Panel 3 (4CU). The fourth line in Panel 6 (3rd) displays the same information as the last line in
Panel 4 (4CU). The fifth line in Panel 6 (4th) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 5 (4CU).
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Table 2: Correlation Between Winning Prices and Covariates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain MA7 -4.0543*** -4.1117*** -2.9911*** -3.1741***
(0.6742) (0.6894) (0.5580) (0.6227)
Rain Day Bought -0.2346 -0.1853 0.0519 0.1779
(0.1434) (0.1416) (0.1558) (0.1531)
Unit 2 Day -167.9547*** -167.8286*** -180.6172***
(19.4659) (19.4542) (21.8896)
Unit 3 Day -173.0328*** -172.9066*** -188.0507***
(19.9287) (19.9165) (22.7544)
Unit 4 Day -176.5446*** -176.5451*** -190.8276***
(20.4404) (20.4387) (23.0968)
Unit 2 Night -237.5795*** -237.8597*** -249.3275***
(24.9031) (24.9367) (27.3493)
Unit 3 Night -243.3244*** -243.5220*** -257.6533***
(25.4507) (25.4838) (28.3077)
Unit 4 Night -254.8376*** -255.1867*** -266.4109***
(25.7254) (25.7817) (28.9070)
Tuesday 26.0232*** 32.1906*** 10.0596
(7.4927) (8.2359) (12.4758)
Wednesday -34.5756*** -29.3838** -31.7270**
(10.6269) (11.9714) (15.4702)
Thursday -59.6530*** -55.4057*** -42.9164***
(10.7704) (12.3518) (15.0439)
Friday -94.9538*** -95.5421*** -76.3654***
(12.7055) (14.4995) (17.2939)
Night -110.0908*** -111.0406*** -102.6780***
(11.3642) (10.9544) (13.4322)
Unit FE No Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE No Yes Yes Yes
Schedule FE No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No Yes Yes
Individual FE No No No Yes
R2 0.016 0.083 0.230 0.359
Observations 13,801 13,801 13,801 13,801
All columns are OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the winning price in each auction (one cuarta).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. FE stands for Fixed Eﬀects. Individual FE refers to a set of dummy
variables identifying diﬀerent winners (names) in our sample. We obtain similar results including Week FE
(a set of dummy variables identifying 52 or 53 weeks of the corresponding year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Sample restricted to auctions with positive bids during the period January 1954 to August 1966.
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Table 3: End-Price Preferences
All units First Unit Non First Unit Second Unit Third Unit Fourth Unit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last Digit Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
0 2,905 49.9 468 32.1 2,437 55.8 809 55.5 811 55.7 817 56.1
1 1,541 26.4 469 32.2 1,072 24.5 370 25.4 369 25.3 333 22.9
2 201 3.5 116 8.0 85 1.9 32 2.2 24 1.7 29 2.0
3 138 2.4 59 4.0 79 1.8 29 2.0 23 1.6 27 1.9
4 68 1.2 40 2.7 28 0.6 10 0.7 9 0.6 9 0.6
5 531 9.1 123 8.4 408 9.3 114 7.8 144 9.9 150 10.3
6 218 3.7 91 6.2 127 2.9 43 3.0 37 2.5 47 3.2
7 71 1.2 33 2.3 38 0.9 19 1.3 12 0.8 7 0.5
8 61 1.0 24 1.6 37 0.9 8 0.6 12 0.8 17 1.2
9 48 0.8 24 1.6 24 0.6 12 0.8 5 0.3 7 0.5
Total 5,828 100 1,457 100 4,371 100 1,457 100 1,457 100 1,457 100
Sample restricted to 4CU auctions (i.e. instances when the same farmer won all four units in a 4-unit
auction). Last Digit refers to the end-digit winning price. Non integer winning prices are excluded.
Table 4: End-Price Preferences by Regime
First Unit Fourth Unit
Strict Compl Weak Substitutes Strict Compl Weak Substitutes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Last Digit Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
0 220 38.3 236 29.0 575 100 240 29.5
1 185 32.2 264 32.5 0 0 323 39.7
2 42 7.3 69 8.5 0 0 24 2.9
3 17 3.0 41 5.0 0 0 26 3.2
4 16 2.8 22 2.7 0 0 6 0.7
5 45 7.8 76 9.4 0 0 125 15.4
6 34 5.9 50 6.2 0 0 43 5.3
7 8 1.4 22 2.7 0 0 6 0.7
8 6 1.0 14 1.7 0 0 13 1.6
9 2 0.4 19 2.3 0 0 7 0.9
Total 575 100 813 100 575 100 813 100
Sample restricted to 4CU auctions. Last Digit refers to the end-digit winning price. Non integer winning
prices are excluded. Regime is determined by assuming all second, third, and four unit prices paid by the
same winner within the same four-unit auction display end-price preference for 0.
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Table 5: Timing Structure of Diﬀerent Winners: Estimation Sample
Month 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Total
1 4 6 0 3 1 11 3 0 0 0 28 0 11 61
2 4 4 0 2 4 2 3 0 0 0 19 0 21 57
3 5 3 0 9 0 1 2 0 0 10 29 8 23 79
4 0 2 0 6 2 5 4 6 0 17 28 38 28 121
5 5 7 0 6 1 13 9 6 9 4 32 30 31 130
6 3 7 0 7 0 8 10 7 10 14 23 25 29 119
7 2 3 0 6 9 26 8 5 13 15 17 21 23 117
8 9 3 0 3 4 10 7 14 18 15 21 16 3 102
9 8 8 0 3 8 10 5 13 0 8 35 19 0 97
10 8 7 3 2 11 2 0 9 0 10 16 19 0 78
11 7 2 3 0 8 2 0 4 0 21 29 23 0 82
12 1 0 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 36 18 12 0 69
Total 48 43 8 43 48 80 47 54 44 106 179 147 128 537
Total, in the last row, refers to the total number of diﬀerent winners for the specific year (column). Given
that, within a year, the same bidders win multiple units in several months, this number is below the sum
over months, by year. Similarly for the last column, where Total is the number of diﬀerent bidders for the
specific month (row) during the 13-year sample. Finally, 537, refers to the total number of diﬀerent bidders
in the whole sample. The monthly average of diﬀerent bidders who bought water in the sample (years 1954
to 1966) is 8.31.
Table 6: Rain Expectations and Regime Coordination
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Future Rain -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0034***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Weekday FE NO YES YES
Schedule FE NO YES YES
Month FE NO NO YES
Sample restricted to the one used in the structural estimation in Table 7. Almost identical results are
obtained using the whole sample. All specifications are probit regressions. Marginal eﬀects are reported.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the regime
is strict complements (see Section 5). Future Rain is a moving average of rain in Mula for seven days after
the corresponding date of the auction (Future Rain is a proxy variable for farmers’ rain expectations for the
day where they are buying water). Past Rain (a moving average of rain in Mula for seven days before the
corresponding date of the auction) and Actual Rain (the amount of rain in Mula in the day of the auction)
are not statistically significant in any of the above regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Structural Estimation
Structural parameters
Specifications
Sequential Auction Model Standard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Valuation [ ˆE(V )] 148.25 127.11 152.93 138.94 166.99 142.73(10.129) (8.153) (70.832) (61.847) (87.373) (81.648)
Sunk Cost (↵ˆ) 0.0301 0.0300 0.0301 0.0303(8.2e-04) (9.7e-04) (3.0e-03) (9.1e-03)
 ˆc0
0.0101 0.0103 0.0102 0.0105
(1.2e-05) (1.3e-04) (4.9e-03) (1.3e-03)
 ˆs0 0.0100 0.0110 0.0101 0.0112
(0.0024) (0.0020) (4.9e-03) (1.3e-03)
Future Rain
 ˆc1 5.99e-10 1.54e-10 5.29e-10 5.94e-10
(1.6e-04) (1.5e-04) (1.1e-10) (3.2e-10)
 ˆs1 0.21279 0.18280 0.21278 0.18282
(0.0059) (0.0037) (0.0267) (0.0775)
Mean ⇢ˆ
- Strict Complements 0.3801 0.2456 0.6811 0.4239
- Weak Substitutes -0.3056 -0.2655 -0.3085 -0.2637
N 8 10 8 10 8 10
Past Rain Polynomial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schedule Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2832 0.2751 0.5303 0.4842 0.1414 0.1333
Log likelihood -12,870 -13,940 -11,423 -12,375 -50,930 -54,956
# of Auctions 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,951
Bootstrapped standard errors (B = 1, 000) are reported in parenthesis (for the Mean Valuation it corresponds
to the bootstrapped standard error corresponding to Z 0t ). Estimates in columns 1 to 4 (sequential auction
model) are obtained using the estimation procedure described in Subsection 6.1 using KNITRO, a solver
for nonlinear optimization, with tolerance level of 1.0e-12 (see Sections D and E in the online appendix for
details). For the distribution of private values and inclusion of covariates, we use an exponential distribu-
tion. Estimates in specifications 5 and 6 (standard model) are MLE obtained by maximizing the likelihood
function from a standard English auction model allowing the mean of the distribution of valuations depend
on the same characteristics as in the other specifications as indicated in equation 7, without fixed costs nor
decreasing marginal returns (the sample is the same as the one in columns 1 to 4, including in this case
all sequential prices in the estimation). Number of years in the sample is 13. Number of months in the
sample is 119. The number of diﬀerent winners (across all 13 years) is 537. The complementarity param-
eter, ⇢, is computed as detailed in the in Section 4. When the goods are strict complements is given by
⇢Ct =
↵ 3 Ct
1 ↵ =
↵ 3( C0 + C1 RFt )
1 ↵ . The table reports, for each specification of the sequential auction model in
columns 1 to 4: ˆ¯⇢C =
↵ˆ 3
⇣
 ˆC0 + ˆ
C
1
1
T (
PT
t=1Da,tR
F
t )
⌘
1 ↵ˆ . Similarly, when the goods are weak substitutes, the table
reports, for each specification: ˆ¯⇢S =
↵ˆ 3
⇣
 ˆS0 + ˆ
S
1
1
T (
PT
t=1(Db,tRFt +Dc,tRFt ))
⌘
1 ↵ˆ .
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Table 8: Structural Estimation (continued)
Structural parameters
Specifications
Sequential Auction Model Standard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covariates
Past Rain ( ˆ1)
-1.668 -2.076 -1.416 -1.2422
(0.301) (0.547) (0.379) (0.664)
(Past Rain)2 ( ˆ2)
0.0076 0.0126 0.0034 0.0032
(0.0448) (0.0958) (0.1496) (0.1520)
Night ( ˆ3)
-27.230 -23.56 -30.003 -25.916
(7.556) (9.649) (5.039) (3.629)
Tuesday ( ˆ4)
-0.2873 -10.985 -2.7134 -2.4331
(0.6449) (9.7063) (7.1630) (2.6197)
Wednesday ( ˆ5)
-2.4616 -2.1883 -5.8751 -5.0944
(0.5406) (0.9572) (2.5602) (6.0395)
Thursday ( ˆ6)
-8.8423 -8.366 -15.755 -13.502
(0.6169) (0.8544) (4.7014) (2.5863)
Friday ( ˆ7)
-17.805 -9.795 -28.154 -24.271
(5.016) (3.418) (12.903) (2.118)
Feb. ( ˆ8)
-11.373 -41.023 -4.8293 -5.0584
(23.299) (35.705) (2.330) (4.949)
Mar. ( ˆ9)
27.356 18.067 34.954 30.126
(12.386) (8.491) (5.218) (1.676)
Apr. ( ˆ8)
82.481 53.902 78.799 67.396
(23.456) (17.127) (3.426) (11.579)
May. ( ˆ10)
115.140 81.751 114.483 96.142
(24.822) (30.187) (4.366) (15.015)
Jun. ( ˆ11)
49.771 40.248 57.478 48.341
(23.112) (18.698) (8.429) (15.16)
Jul. ( ˆ12)
195.980 115.752 225.337 191.341
(26.035) (48.982) (216.025) (102.962)
Aug. ( ˆ13)
233.750 183.06 247.57 210.08
(28.562) (27.608) (195.347) (87.953)
Sep. ( ˆ14)
74.494 160.78 88.173 74.259
(23.684) (34.040) (39.318) (12.133)
Oct. ( ˆ15)
77.623 62.664 81.093 69.953
(14.532) (22.385) (30.165) (10.558)
Nov. ( ˆ16)
3.3622 -13.302 13.2099 10.6131
(2.3941) (7.513) (16.725) (9.6974)
Dec. ( ˆ17)
7.4696 -0.9495 2.8462 2.2106
(2.2226) (2.5513) (3.6735) (4.0308)
Intercept ( ˆ0)
148.253 127.117 90.885 96.131 101.717 87.978
(10.121) (8.153) (32.274) (25.754) (179.285) (74.073)
N 8 10 8 10 8 10
Pseudo R2 0.2832 0.2751 0.5303 0.4842 0.1414 0.1333
Log likelihood -12,870 -13,940 -11,423 -12,375 -50,930 -54,956
# of Auctions 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,951
See notes in Table 7.
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